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Abstract 
 
Scholars have shown that Native Americans who served in the US armed forces during the 
Vietnam War developed radical ideas while in service that led them to become involved in 
radical activism, primarily with the Red Power (Native sovereignty) movement. Chapter 1 
will examine in greater detail than ever before the psychological phenomena that had a 
radical influence on some Native GIs during the Vietnam era. Chapter 2 will begin to explore 
the implications of this influence, and will discuss the participation of Native GIs in Red 
Power activism through the GI resistance movement – a previously unexplored area of 
study. Chapter 3 will then explore the participation of Native veterans in the Red Power 
movement after returning from service, as well as the influence of their ideas on the anti-
war movement. In concluding, a tentative evaluation will be made of the nature and extent 
of Native GI and veteran influence on radical politics and activism.  
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Introduction 
 
͞EaĐh tǁeŶtieth-ĐeŶtuƌǇ AŵeƌiĐaŶ ǁaƌ͟, histoƌiaŶ ‘ussel Baƌsh ;ϮϬϬϭ: ϰϬϱ-406) tells us, 
͞has ďeeŶ folloǁed ďǇ a ŵajoƌ ŶatioŶal IŶdiaŶ-ƌights ŵoǀeŵeŶt͟. “uĐĐessiǀe geŶeƌations of 
Native American veterans, many of whom had never left their isolated communities, 
returned to the civilian world with ͞shaƌpeŶed͟ ethnic identities, a new found worldliness, 
more fully-formed political opinions, and keener leadership abilities (Bernstein, 1991: 133-
158; Britten, 1997: 184-187). Many of those who returned from the World Wars, for 
instance, became community leaders and activists, making their presence felt in a number 
of national debates over government policies relevant to Native people (Abe, 2007: 59-61; 
Britten, 1997: 174-175 + 184).  
 
Native veterans of WWII, in particular, were very politically active, mainly in 
response to the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s eŶdoƌseŵeŶt of so-Đalled ͚teƌŵiŶatioŶ͛ – a controversial and 
divisive series of policies designed to terminate the sovereign statuses of Native tribes, and 
compel them to assimilate with the rest of the country (Holm, 1985: 160-165). A number of 
WWII veterans who opposed termination rose to prominence in activist organisations such 
as the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI), where they were later joined by like-
minded veterans of the Korean War (1950-1953) in leading the charge against termination, 
and campaigning in favour of policies that they hoped would be more beneficial to their 
communities (Bernstein, 1991: 116 + 133-136 + 158-159; Carroll, 2008: 146; Cobb, 2007: 61; 
Holm, 1989: 56-57; Rosier, 2009: 171-175).  
 
During the period of US participation in the Vietnam War (c. 1965-1973), Natives 
served, as they had during earlier conflicts, at a very high rate ;O͛Nell, 1999: 445). By 
conservative estimates, over 82,000 Natives served during the war, more than half of whom 
are thought to have been sent to Southeast Asia, and 226 of whom never came home 
(Potts, 2011: 798). While Native GIs fought and died in Vietnam, US involvement in the war 
was a focal point around which Native communities back in the States formulated and 
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articulated their campaign against termination policy, and in favour of a restoration of tribal 
sovereignty.  
 
Advocates of what came to be known as the Red Power movement watched events 
in the ex-colonial third-world, Southeast Asia especially, with great interest. They recognised 
parallels between their own struggle against what they increasingly saw as US imperialism 
and that of the Vietnamese, a seemingly kindred people, with a similar culture, and a similar 
history of colonisation and oppression (Cobb, 2007: 162-173; Rosier, 2009: 221-222; Shreve, 
2011: 41-42 + 158-159; Steiner, 1968: 277-283). The way in which Red Power activists and 
their supporters drew on the language, imagery, and controversy surrounding the war, and 
made analogies between themselves and the Vietnamese in their rhetoric, in their writings, 
on their picket-signs, and in their communications to the government, were also powerful 
and effective discursive strategies (Allen, 2002: 120-121; Cobb, 2007: 171-172; Rosier, 2009: 
249-250 + 260-261; Smith, 2012: 18-42 + 98-100 + 188-195).  
 
Scholars have shown that Native GIs serving on the ground in Southeast Asia 
developed similar ideas about the war and the people of the region. A number of writers, 
Tom Holm (1996) and Al Carroll (2008: 147-162) in particular, provide ample evidence of the 
way in which many Native GIs actively identified with Southeast Asians. As a result, some 
Native servicemen experienced psychological turmoil and inner conflict, and began to 
question their roles in the armed forces and the war (Barsh, 2001: 380-381).  
 
Scholars – defeƌƌiŶg ŵaiŶlǇ to Holŵ͛s ;1996: 169-179Ϳ aŶd Caƌƌoll͛s ;2008: 147-172) 
work – have noted that, in response to their troubling wartime and post-service 
experiences, some Native veterans were politically radicalised, and became involved in the 
Red Power movement (Barsh, 2001: 390; Forbes, 1994: 125; Johnson, 1996: 31-32; Marez, 
2004: 267; Paul, 2014: 247; Pencak, 2009: 45-46 + 54; Potts, 2011: 798; Riseman, 2015: 215-
216; Rosier, 2009: 262-264; Schwartz, 2013: 30-31 + 38-42 + 186-187; Tóth, 2016: 36-37; 
Way of the Warrior, 2007).  
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Though it has introduced a number of compelling lines of enquiry, the work of this 
small group of scholars on the connections between Native military service and Red Power 
activism during the Vietnam era has taken place within projects that are focused on other 
issues, and is thus unavoidably reductive and generalised. Particularly detrimental to our 
current understandiŶg of this issue is the eǆistiŶg sĐholaƌship͛s exclusive focus on the 
radicalisation of Native GIs who served in Southeast Asia, without addressing the 
experiences of those who served elsewhere during the same period. When discussing the 
implications of radicalisation, the existing scholarship has also focused solely on the radical 
activities of Native veterans post-service, and fails to consider those of Native GIs, who, as 
this study will show, had at least as much of an influence on Red Power while still in service 
as their veteran peers did after leaving the military.  
 
The following study will begin to fill some of these gaps. Chapter 1 will examine in 
greater detail the psychological phenomena that had a radical influence on some Native GIs 
during the Vietnam War. Chapter 2 will begin to explore the implications of this influence, 
and will discuss the participation of Native GIs in Red Power activism through the GI 
resistance movement – a previously unexplored area of study. Chapter 3 will then explore 
the participation of Native veterans in Red Power activism after returning from service, and 
the influence of their ideas on the anti-war movement. In concluding, a tentative evaluation 
will be made of the nature and extent of Native GI and veteran influence on the Red Power 
movement and radical activism more generally.  
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(1) Servicemen 
 
Military service during the Vietnam War – ͞a ǁaƌ of atƌoĐities, ƌeǀeŶge, toƌtuƌe, aŶd 
ĐƌueltǇ͟ aĐĐoƌdiŶg to oŶe ĐoŵŵeŶtatoƌ, ͞aŶ oƌgǇ of iŶdisĐƌiŵiŶate destƌuĐtioŶ͟ aĐĐoƌdiŶg 
to another – was incredibly traumatic for those involved in combat on the frontlines in 
Vietnam, and profoundly troubling, in a more abstract sense, for those who served in other 
capacities (Cortright, 2005: 154-155; Westheider, 2007: xiii + 120-121). Many ethnic 
minority GIs, whether fighting in the warzones of Southeast Asia or stationed elsewhere, 
also experienced racism in the military, which in turn engendered a variety of additional 
traumas and moral dilemmas, and Native servicemen were no exception.  
 
Cherokee ex-Marine Dwight Birdwell (& Nolan, 2000: 124-126) recalls that Natives 
like himself were ridden by their non-Native colleagues with derogatory remarks about 
͞fiƌeǁateƌ͟ aŶd ͞ƌedskiŶs͟. Otheƌs ƌecall the way in which Natives and other GIs of colour 
were often detailed to non-skilled, ͞diƌtǇ͟ joďs while their white colleagues were able to 
avoid such tasks (Anderson, et al, 1974: 194-195). Standing Rock Army Sergeant Robert 
Primaux (quoted in Murg, 2012) felt that non-Natiǀes had issues seƌǀiŶg uŶdeƌ hiŵ. ͞Theiƌ 
iŵage of IŶdiaŶ people͟, Pƌiŵauǆ ;Ƌuoted iŶ Muƌg, ϮϬϭϮͿ ƌeĐalls, ͞ǁas that I͛ŵ a dƌuŶk.͟  
 
As Dwight Birdwell (& Nolan, 2000: 124-126) recounts, Natives were invariably in the 
extreme minority, and could not fall back on numbers. Consequently, he writes, ͞ǁe had to 
put up with a certain amount of gƌief aďout ouƌ IŶdiaŶ ďlood͟ ;Biƌdǁell & NolaŶ, ϮϬϬϬ: ϭϮϰ-
126). Finding allies among non-Natives was not always easy, either. In some cases, Native 
GIs were taken in by Chicanos, who were much greater in number and shared certain 
physical and cultural characteristics with Natives that helped break the ice, but racial 
tensions among US servicemen were high during the course of the conflict, just as they were 
among American civilians (e.g. Cummings, 1998: 136; Mitchell, 2004: 12 + 16).  
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As the war dragged on, Potowatomi infantryman Larry Mitchell (2004: 12-13) 
observed an escalation of ethnic animosities within the American ranks, and would later 
describe the pattern of race relations among servicemen in Vietnam as increasingly 
resembling a forŵ of ͞self-imposed segregation ŵuĐh like iŶ a pƌisoŶ͟. ͞BlaĐks h[u]Ŷg 
aƌouŶd ǁith ďlaĐks … Whites h[u]Ŷg aƌouŶd ǁith ǁhites … AŶd I huŶg aƌouŶd ǁith the 
Mexican guys͟, he ǁƌites (Mitchell, 2004: 7-8 + 12).  
 
Moreover, these racial divisions became increasingly political in nature. Dwight 
Birdwell (& Nolan, 2000: 82 + 120-122) ƌeĐalls the ǁaǇ iŶ ǁhiĐh his oǁŶ uŶit ͞fƌaĐtuƌed͟ 
down racial and ideological lines – ͞ǁe ǁeƌe as split as the people ďaĐk hoŵe͟, he writes. In 
1968, he accidentally interrupted a meeting of Black Power advocates in one of the tents in 
his camp, where he was introduced to some of the ideas that were emerging in this 
increasingly radical political climate. IŶitiallǇ ŵet ǁith the ͞stoŶǇ faĐes͟ of a gƌoup of ďlaĐk 
GIs, their leader quickly recognised him as a Native, and thus as one and the same – in terms 
of oppression and second-class status – with the ďlaĐk soldieƌs. ͞He͛s a fuĐkiŶ͛ IŶdiaŶ͟, he 
ƌepoƌtedlǇ deĐlaƌed, ͞He͛s oŶe of us!͟ ;Biƌdǁell & NolaŶ, ϮϬϬϬ: ϭϮϲͿ.  
 
During this, his first unexpected taste of radical black politics, Birdwell (& Nolan, 
2000: xix-xxi + 126-127), who had personal experience of racism, empathised with some of 
his Ŷeǁ fƌieŶds͛ ĐoŵplaiŶts, but he did not share their political outlook. In fact, he adopted 
the cynical stance typical of more conservative-minded servicemen, coming to perceive of 
such groups, which were at that time thriving among minority GIs, as symptomatic of a 
ǁideƌ deĐliŶe iŶ disĐipliŶe aŶd ŵoƌale theŶ takiŶg plaĐe ǁithiŶ the ŵilitaƌǇ. ͞[B]laĐk 
disaffeĐtioŶ ǁith the sǇsteŵ seeŵed to take oŶ a life of its oǁŶ iŶ VietŶaŵ͟, he concluded, 
͞It ďeĐaŵe aŶ eǆĐuse foƌ Ŷot doiŶg Ǉouƌ joď͟ ;Biƌdǁell & NolaŶ, ϮϬϬϬ: ϭϮϲ-127).  
 
Other Native GIs were more sensitive to issues of race. Blackfoot Marine Woody Kipp 
(2004: 45-46), for instance, observed formally arranged fights between black and white 
Marines while serving in Vietnam in the late 1960s. On one such occasion, the men were 
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reprimanded for fighting among theŵselǀes ǁhile theiƌ ͞tƌue eŶeŵǇ͟ – the Vietnamese 
Communists – remained at large out in the jungle. Kipp (2004: 45-46), who had earlier 
ǁitŶessed ǁhite MaƌiŶes ĐeleďƌatiŶg at the Ŷeǁs of MalĐolŵ X͛s assassiŶatioŶ, did Ŷot 
agƌee. ͞White ŵeŶ haǀe Ŷeǀeƌ uŶdeƌstood͟, Kipp ;ϮϬϬϰ: ϰϱ-ϰϲͿ ǁƌites, ͞hoǁ daƌk-skinned 
ŵeŶ peƌĐeiǀe theiƌ tƌue eŶeŵǇ͟: 
The ǁhite AŵeƌiĐaŶ doesŶ͛t … realize the great gap he created when he let his greed 
get the ďest of hiŵ: ǁith IŶdiaŶs it͛s … the laŶd that ǁas stoleŶ; ǁith ďlaĐks it͛s 
slaǀeƌǇ …  
 
Perceived physical similarities between some Natives and Southeast Asians, in terms 
of hair-type and colour, skin-tone, and certain facial features, sometimes attracted 
unwanted attention from their non-Native comrades (Kipp, 2004: 35-36). During WWII, 
Native GIs had even been mistakenly captured by their own colleagues on suspicion of being 
Japanese interlopers, and at least one similar case of mistaken identity later took place in 
Vietnam (Holm, 2007: 81-83). When Oglala infantryman Darrell New Plenty Stars (& Evans, 
2008: 12-14) was badly wounded, American medics mistook him for an enemy combatant, 
and he later awoke to find himself back in the States, chained to a bed in a hospital ward for 
Vietnamese POWs at the Colorado Army Base, too injured to speak and reveal his true 
identity (New Plenty Stars & Evans, 2008: 13).  
 
While he lay there waiting for someone to realise their mistake, New Plenty Stars (& 
Evans, 2008: 13-14) came to resent the fact that he was being treated as a foreigner and an 
enemy, first by his own colleagues, and now in his own country, which was particularly 
offensive to him because he felt that he, as a Native – ͞a First American͟ – ǁas ͞more 
American than most of the guys in my unit͟. Even after they discovered the truth, New 
Plenty Stars (& Evans, 2008: 14-15) had to wait some time before the Army would process 
him out of the POW ward.  
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Moreover, his troubles did not end after he was finally released. While serving out 
the remainder of his tour on light duty in Colorado, a black GI was murdered in his barracks, 
and he became the prime suspect (New Plenty Stars & Evans, 2008: 17-23). New Plenty 
Stars (& Evans, 2008: 17-21) provided a verifiable alibi – he had not been in the barracks at 
the time of the murder – but the military police, apparently convinced of his guilt, 
questioned him aggressively for days, trying to elicit a confession. Driven to what he 
desĐƌiďes as ͞a state of Ŷeaƌ fƌeŶzǇ, aŶgƌǇ, eǆhausted, aŶd sĐaƌed to death͟, he ďegaŶ to 
fƌaŵe his oƌdeal ǁithiŶ a ƌaĐial ĐoŶteǆt. ͞WhǇ haǀe I ďeeŶ siŶgled out foƌ ƋuestioŶiŶg?͟, he 
thought to hiŵself, ͞Is it ďeĐause I͛ŵ aŶ IŶdiaŶ?͟ ;Neǁ PleŶtǇ “tars & Evans, 2008: 17-21).  
 
Seeking legal advice, he explained his predicament to a group of military attorneys. 
͞It͛s pƌoďaďlǇ ďeĐause I͛ŵ IŶdiaŶ͟, he told theŵ, ͞ThiŶgs like this happeŶ to us all the tiŵe͟ 
(New Plenty Stars & Evans, 2008: 21-23). Just as he had feared, New Plenty Stars (& Evans, 
2008: 21-25) was soon formally charged with the offence – an injustice that he directly 
connected to issues of race, and to the history of Natives in the US:  
I had honorably served my country, the country of my birth that had been overrun 
ďǇ EuƌopeaŶs … ‘uled ďǇ ǁhites foƌ geŶeƌatioŶs, Ŷatiǀes like ŵǇself ĐoŶtiŶued to 
suffeƌ ďetƌaǇal, poǀeƌtǇ, pƌejudiĐe, aŶd eǀeƌǇ otheƌ … iŶjustiĐe ŵǇ iƌate ŵiŶd Đould 
think of. Hatred spreads like a fire running wild, and mine was out of control. 
 
At this point, his building resentment was directed at whites – even his new lawyers, 
who, though sympathetic to his case, in his opinion, would most likely let him down (New 
Plenty Stars & Evans, 2008: 24-ϮϱͿ. ͞TheǇ ǁeƌe, afteƌ all, ǁhite͟, he thought, ͞Whites ǁeƌe 
ŵǇ eŶeŵies͟ ;Neǁ PleŶtǇ “taƌs & EǀaŶs, ϮϬϬϴ: ϮϱͿ. Afteƌ he ǁas eǀeŶtuallǇ aĐƋuitted, 
͞[ƌ]eluĐtaŶtlǇ͟, he ǁƌites, ͞I had to adŵit … that ŵaǇďe theƌe ǁeƌe soŵe good ǁhite 
people͟ ;Neǁ PleŶtǇ “taƌs & EǀaŶs, ϮϬϬϴ: ϮϱͿ. WheŶ he learned more about the case, 
however, his resentment was redirected. It turned out that the people who had implicated 
him in the murder were a group of black servicemen, who had reportedly been involved in a 
dispute with the victim (New Plenty Stars & Evans, 2008: 25). ͞EǀeƌǇoŶe suspeĐted͟, Neǁ 
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PleŶtǇ “taƌs ;& EǀaŶs, ϮϬϬϴ: ϮϱͿ ǁƌites, ͞that I, the haŶdǇ IŶdiaŶ sĐapegoat, had ďeeŶ set up 
ďǇ those ďlaĐk soldieƌs͟: 
I felt that blacks, of all races, should have known the miseries of discrimination … 
And so it was that I added blacks to my growing list of people I wanted nothing more 
to do with. 
 
When New Plenty Stars (& Evans, 2008: 27) was later punished for a minor infraction 
by being made to polish a cannon, his reaction indicates that, by this point, he was 
beginning to think about everything that was happening to him in the military in terms of his 
Natiǀe ideŶtitǇ aŶd the ĐoloŶial histoƌǇ of his people. ͞I pƌoďaďlǇ deseƌǀed puŶishŵeŶt͟, he 
ǁƌites, ͞ďut ĐaŶŶoŶs had ďeeŶ tuƌŶed oŶ ŵǇ people … I ǁas … polishiŶg the long hated 
sǇŵďol. Talk aďout addiŶg iŶsult to iŶjuƌǇ!͟ ;Neǁ PleŶtǇ “taƌs & EǀaŶs, ϮϬϬϴ: ϮϳͿ. Afteƌ his 
harrowing experiences, New Plenty Stars (& Evans, 2008: 27-28) got out of the Army as soon 
as he could, but the sense of betrayal he felt at having first been treated as an enemy, and 
then later as a scapegoat, by his own countrymen, purely on the grounds of his race, stayed 
with him, and would underpin his subsequent sympathy – and sometimes active support – 
for the Red Power movement.  
 
Native GIs were also labelled by non-Native colleagues who, as Oglala serviceman 
JohŶ MeaŶs ;Ƌuoted iŶ Maƌtz, ϭϵϴϲ: ϴAͿ put it, ͞had ǁatĐhed too ŵaŶǇ ŵoǀies aďout 
IŶdiaŶs.͟ HollǇǁood aŶd otheƌ foƌŵs of populaƌ ŵedia haǀe ĐeƌtaiŶlǇ ďeeŶ ƌesponsible for 
disseminating stereotypes of Natives, especially in relation to warfare (Schwartz, 2013: 4 + 
29-30). From the blood-drunk, tomahawk wielding savages of the old Westerns, to the stoic, 
self-sacrificing, impossibly wise and intuitive scouts and trackers of some more recent 
depictions; these are images with which we are all familiar, and which were applied 
arbitrarily to Native GIs during the Vietnam era (Holm, 1989: 56-57; Schwartz, 2013: 29-30).  
 
These stereotypes were incredibly pervasive, to the extent that they could actively 
determine the kinds of roles available to Native servicemen, with potentially deadly 
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consequences. Native GIs were often assigned to the most dangerous combat roles on the 
grounds of stereotypical, race-based assumptions about their innate abilities in relation to 
warfare, such as martial prowess, bush-skills, and intuitiveness – they were even thought to 
have better hearing and eyesight (Holm, 1989: 62-64). Holm (1996: 88-90 + 137-139 + 150-
158Ϳ Đalls this pheŶoŵeŶoŶ ͞IŶdiaŶ “Đout “ǇŶdƌoŵe͟ ;I““Ϳ, and argues that it was a key 
reason for the inordinate assignment of Natives to roles such as scouting, tracking, covert 
operations, and ͚ǁalkiŶg poiŶt͛ – ǁalkiŶg ahead of oŶe͛s uŶit duƌiŶg ŵissioŶs. It has even 
been suggested that, by virtue of ISS, Native infantrymen were distributed throughout the 
Army in such a way that each platoon might have at least one Native walking point 
(Robinson & Lucas, 2010: 70-ϳϭͿ. CoŶseƋueŶtlǇ, ͞IŶdiaŶ GI͛s iŶ VietŶaŵ͟, one seƌǀiĐeŵeŶ͛s 
newspaper declared in 1970, ͞aƌe … dǇiŶg at a dispƌopoƌtioŶatelǇ high ƌate͟ ;Military 
Intelligence, 1970: 2).  
 
͞Oh good,͟ Ojiďǁe MaƌiŶe Jiŵ Noƌthƌup͛s ;ϮϬϭϲͿ supeƌioƌs ǁould iŶǀaƌiaďlǇ saǇ 
ǁheŶ he joiŶed a Ŷeǁ uŶit, ͞ǁe͛ǀe got aŶ IŶdiaŶ, he ĐaŶ ǁalk poiŶt.͟ Cherokee Army Ranger 
Billy Walkabout (1988: 78; quoted in Bedard, 1998: 64) was similarly stereotyped by his 
colleagues as a natural path-finder, and Đast iŶto aŶ iŶĐƌediďlǇ daŶgeƌous ƌole as the ͚poiŶt 
ŵaŶ͛ of a LoŶg-Range Reconnaissance Patrol, running covert operations behind enemy lines 
– an assignment that, he felt, was based on erroneous assumptions about his background 
and abilities. Indeed, back in Oklahoma he had been a member of a country club, not a 
warrior society, and went golfing, not hunting (Walkabout, quoted in Bedard, 1998: 64). 
͞TheǇ figuƌed ǁe had these Ŷatuƌal skills,͟ he ƌeĐalls, ͞hell, ǁe had the saŵe skills theǇ had͟ 
(Walkabout, quoted in Bedard, 1998: 64). In a recent interview, Oglala veteran Tony Bush 
(quoted in Wetherholt, 2013) makes a particularly poignant statement concerning ISS:  
TheǇ͛ƌe the oŶes that taught ŵe to fight … TheǇ͛d all saǇ shit [like] ͚Natiǀe AŵeƌiĐaŶs 
aƌe Ŷatuƌal ďoƌŶ fighteƌs͛ … Yeah, ďullshit … I͛d saǇ ͚We ďleed too, ǁe͛ƌe just like you 
guǇs͛ … TheǇ doŶ͛t like that. 
 
The imposition of stereotypes concerning Native warriorhood was commonly 
aĐĐoŵpaŶied ďǇ the ŶiĐkŶaŵe ͚Đhief͛. Some of those who understood the meaning and 
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import of the title of Chief to Native cultures found the dismissive way in which it was used 
iŶ ƌefeƌeŶĐe to theŵ offeŶsiǀe ;e.g. Noƌthƌup, Ƌuoted iŶ MoliŶ, ϭϵϵϵ: ϰϭͿ. ͞[A]lthough AƌŵǇ 
peƌsoŶŶel … displaǇ theiƌ Ŷaŵe oŶ ǀiƌtuallǇ eǀeƌǇ aƌtiĐle of ĐlothiŶg͟, WiŶŶeďago ex-
iŶfaŶtƌǇŵaŶ GeƌďeŶ Eaƌth ;Ƌuoted iŶ MoliŶ, ϭϵϵϵ: ϰϯͿ tells us, ͞I ǁas alǁaǇs ƌefeƌƌed to as 
͚Đhief͛͟. Eaƌth ;Ƌuoted iŶ MoliŶ, ϭϵϵϵ: ϰϯͿ felt that the ǁoƌd ǁas ƌaĐist, plaĐiŶg it oŶ a paƌ 
with derogatory terms he had heard US personnel use in reference to East Asian people 
suĐh as ͚Ŷip͛, ͚ĐhiŶk͛, aŶd, of paƌtiĐulaƌ ƌeleǀaŶĐe duƌiŶg the VietŶaŵ ĐoŶfliĐt, ͚gook͛.  
 
Others felt that such language was more than just insulting – it created false 
impressions about them that may actually have fed into ISS (e.g. Kipp, 2004: 35; Molin, 
1999: 42; TeCube, 2000: + 216). Oglala Army veteran Chuck Richards (quoted in Martz, 
1986: 8A), founder of the Oglala Lakota Vietnam Veterans Association, recalls that 
͞ǁheŶeǀeƌ theƌe ǁas soŵethiŶg daŶgeƌous to do … it ǁas alǁaǇs, ͚Đhief, Ǉou ǁalk poiŶt͛ … 
͚Đhief, Ǉou lead this patƌol.͛͟ EĐhoiŶg his peeƌs͛ ƌeŵaƌks aďout the iŶflueŶĐe of HollǇǁood 
on ISS, Richards (quoted in Martz, 1986: 8A) reminds us that, though his officers might have 
stereotyped Native GIs as ͞the ‘aŵďos of VietŶaŵ͟, iŶ ƌealitǇ, ͞ǁe ǁeƌe just as sĐaƌed as 
eǀeƌǇďodǇ else.͟  
 
As victims of racism themselves, many Native GIs were also deeply troubled by the 
racist abuse they saw being inflicted upon others. General William Westmoreland (quoted in 
Newsweek, 1967), head of US operations in Vietnam between 1964 and 1968, aptly set the 
tone for the way the armed forces would treat Southeast Asians throughout the conflict 
when he declared that, in metaphorical terms, the dynamic between the Communist and US 
forces theƌe ǁas that ďetǁeeŶ ͞teƌŵites͟ aŶd ͞teƌŵite killeƌs͟. CƌuĐiallǇ, WestŵoƌelaŶd͛s 
(quoted in Newsweek, 1967) dehumanising language was chillingly reminiscent of a remark 
made just over a hundred years earlier by another US military leader, Colonel John 
Chivington, in reference to the extermination of Native people in Colorado.  
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͞[K]ill aŶd sĐalp all, little aŶd ďig,͟ ChiǀiŶgtoŶ ;Ƌuoted iŶ MaŶŶ, ϮϬϬϭ: ϳϱͿ ƌepoƌtedlǇ 
told his ŵeŶ ďefoƌe theǇ desĐeŶded oŶ a gƌoup of Natiǀes at “aŶd Cƌeek, CO iŶ ϭϴϲϰ, ͞Ŷits 
make liĐe.͟ ChiǀiŶgtoŶ ;Ƌuoted iŶ MaŶŶ, ϮϬϬϭ: ϳϱͿ ǁould go doǁŶ iŶ histoƌǇ that daǇ as the 
iŶstigatoƌ of oŶe of the ŵost iŶfaŵous ŵassaĐƌes of the IŶdiaŶ Waƌs. Thus, WestŵoƌelaŶd͛s 
(quoted in Newsweek, 1967) later remark was not only evidence of Vietnam-era anti-East 
Asian racism. It must also be seen as part of a historical continuum of violent racism – one 
that connects mid-20th century Southeast Asia to the historic US.  
 
Consequently, just as Native GIs themselves were subject to racial discrimination, 
they also witnessed – and in some cases felt they had been compelled to participate in – the 
racist abuse of East Asian people. As documented by a number of our sources, derogatory 
teƌŵs like ͚gook͛ ǁeƌe a paƌt of the eǀeƌǇdaǇ ǀernacular of American personnel stationed in 
Southeast Asia and Japan (Anderson et al, 1974: 194-195; Gano, 2016; Kipp, 2004; 
Walkabout, 1988: 77-81). As Dwight Birdwell (2000: 134-141Ϳ laŵeŶts, ŵaŶǇ GIs ͞had ŵoƌe 
feeliŶgs foƌ theiƌ pet dogs͟ than they did for the Vietnamese civilians – a lack of empathy 
that was all too often displayed through violence.  
 
According to Larry Mitchell (2004: 20-21), this sort of behaviour was actively 
encouraged, and he claims that his own period of training before leaving for Vietnam was 
ďasiĐallǇ ͞fouƌ aŶd a half ŵoŶths of ĐoŶstaŶtlǇ dehuŵaŶiziŶg the VietŶaŵese͟. IŶĐulĐatiŶg 
servicemen in this way was not without purpose. Some Native GIs came to feel that the use 
of this type of language dehumanised Southeast Asian people in such a way that it made it 
͞easieƌ foƌ [GIs] to kill aŶd to justifǇ doiŶg so͟ – it functioned as a coping mechanism for 
those facing combat (Earth, quoted in Molin, 1999: 43; Mitchell, 2004: 21; Northrup, 2013: 
177).  
 
Moreover, a number of Native servicemen noticed that their non-Native colleagues 
also often referred to enemy-ĐoŶtƌolled teƌƌitoƌǇ as ͚IŶdiaŶ ĐouŶtƌǇ͛, aŶd the eŶeŵǇ 
theŵselǀes as ͚IŶdiaŶs͛ ;Eaƌth, Ƌuoted iŶ MoliŶ, ϭϵϵϵ: ϰϯ; Holm, 1996: 175; TeCube, 2000: 
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166-167). This type of language was used even at the highest levels of the military 
establishment, and was part and parcel of a general tendency at this time to translate the 
imagery and terminology of the historic American frontier, including its original inhabitants, 
the Native Americans, into a modern Vietnam-era context (Carroll, 2008: 161-162; Paul, 
2014: 344-347; Rosier, 2009: 244-247; Fitzgerald, 2002: 367-368).  
 
Scholars have suggested that, during the Vietnam War, Southeast Asia effectively 
replaced the historic American West as a new frontier, replete with its own Indians, who 
could be dismissed as racially inferior, collateralised, and thus justifiably bulldozed in much 
the same way as the real Indians of North America had been (Chomsky, 1972: 120; 
Fitzgerald, 2002: 368; Rosier, 2009: 244-247; Stannard, 1992: 252-253). Advocates of more 
forceful and destructive military strategies in Vietnam justified their ideas through invoking 
the Indian Wars, and some of those serving on the ground who were involved in military 
atrocities, such as the infamous My Lai massacre, are known to have made similar 
references, often couched in overtly racist terms, in rationalising their own behaviour 
(Carroll, 2008: 161-162; Drinnon, 1997: 455-457; Fitzgerald, 2002: 367-368; Rosier, 2009: 
244-247). 
 
For some Native GIs, the conflation of their own demographic with the Vietnamese 
Communists – AŵeƌiĐa͛s Ŷuŵďeƌ oŶe eŶeŵǇ at that time, and an enemy who they 
themselves were expected to fight and kill – was a troubling concept. Gerben Earth (quoted 
in Molin, 1999: 43), for instance, came to feel that the use of teƌŵs like ͚IŶdiaŶ ĐouŶtƌǇ͛ ǁas 
effeĐtiǀelǇ ͞keepiŶg the idea … aliǀe that IŶdiaŶ people aƌe still … the eŶeŵǇ.͟ Moƌe 
iŵpoƌtaŶtlǇ, he also dƌeǁ ĐoŶŶeĐtioŶs ďetǁeeŶ the ƌaĐist use of the ǁoƌd ͚gook͛ iŶ 
reference to Southeast Asians and the use of similarly derogatory terms about Natives 
during the historic Indian Wars (Earth, quoted in Molin, 1999: 43). He was not alone.  
 
Alienated by the racism of their colleagues, the military establishment, and the war 
itself, some Native servicemen began to draw their own analogies between their ancestors 
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and communities back home and those of the Southeast Asians with whom they came into 
contact – connections which, in some cases, had a profound impact on the way they felt 
about what they were doing. Wichita paratrooper Stan Holder, for instance, came to feel 
that he had ďeeŶ ͞ďƌaiŶǁashed͟, that the AƌŵǇ͛s effoƌts to Đƌeate ƌaĐist killiŶg ŵaĐhiŶes out 
of its recruits had, at least for a time, worked on him, even in spite of his own experiences of 
racism: 
I waŶted to go out aŶd kill soŵe ͚gooks͛ … I ƌeallǇ [did] … I guess I had ďeeŶ totallǇ 
ďƌaiŶǁashed, ďeĐause I Đould ƌeŵeŵďeƌ ǁheŶ people used to Đall ŵe ͚ďlaŶket-ass͛, 
oƌ ͚Đhief͛, aŶd theǇ still did …, ďut theƌe I ǁas … saǇiŶg, ͚I ǁaŶŶa go kill soŵe ͚gooks͛͛ 
(Hearts and Minds, 1974). 
 
Cherokee-Quapaw Marine Geary Hobson (2016), who served throughout East Asia in 
the early 1960s, was given cause to reconsider the value and purpose of the American 
mission there ǁheŶ he ǁitŶessed the ͞iŶĐƌediďle disƌespeĐt͟ shoǁŶ towards the people of 
the region by his fellow Marines, whose racist behaviour reminded him of his own 
eǆpeƌieŶĐes of ƌaĐisŵ ďaĐk iŶ the U“. ͞[A]ŶtagoŶisŵ toǁaƌds AsiatiĐs͟, he ǁƌites, ͞ǁould 
ďƌiŶg ŵe ďaĐk to that feeliŶg of alieŶatioŶ aŶd … leaǀe ŵe ǁoŶdeƌiŶg, ǁhat͛s ƌeallǇ goiŶg oŶ 
heƌe?͟ ;Hoďson, 2016).  
 
Psychologist George Mariscal (2006: 355-362) refers to these types of experiences as 
͞stƌuĐtuƌes of ƌeĐogŶitioŶ͟. As MaƌisĐal ;ϮϬϬϲ: ϯϱϱ-362) has demonstrated, some minority 
GIs who served in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam era recognised something of 
themselves – namely their oppression – in the Southeast Asians with whom they came into 
contact, thus forming structures of recognition. Though Native GIs were not the focus of 
MaƌisĐal͛s ;ϮϬϬϲ: ϯϱϱ-362) work, which was based chiefly on analyses of Vietnam War-
related fiction written by Chicano veterans, his ideas are easily applicable to the experiences 
of Native servicemen.  
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In the cases of Native GIs, structures of recognition were generally formed on 
initially superficial grounds, in response to a recognition of the perceived physical 
similarities between Natives and East Asians mentioned above. As Oglala infantryman Guy 
Dull KŶife, Jƌ. ;Ƌuoted iŶ ‘osieƌ, ϮϬϬϵ: ϮϰϴͿ puts it, ͞We kiŶd of looked alike … aŶd it seeŵed 
to make a difference. To me aŶd to theŵ.͟ ͞The VietŶaŵese sĐƌutiŶized ŵe,͟ Woody Kipp 
(2004: 35) ƌeĐouŶts, ͞ǁoŶdeƌiŶg hoǁ I had Đoŵe to look so like theŵ͟ ;Kipp, ϮϬϬϰ: ϯϱͿ. The 
pidgiŶ EŶglish phƌase, ͞You saŵe saŵe Viet CoŶg͟, ǁas ofteŶ diƌeĐted at Kipp ;ϮϬϬϰ: ϯϱͿ 
during such interactions, variations of which appear in similar episodes recounted by other 
Natives who served in Vietnam (e.g. Mitchell, 2004: 6 + 20-21; TeCube, 2000: 32).  
 
͞OŶe ǀillageƌ said to ŵe ͚“aŵe, “aŵe͛,͟ LaƌƌǇ MitĐhell ;ϮϬϬϰ: ϲ + ϮϬ-21) recalls, 
͞theƌe ǁas a lot of ǀeƌaĐitǇ iŶ those tǁo ǁoƌds.͟ Despite haǀiŶg ďeeŶ told ƌepeatedlǇ duƌiŶg 
his tƌaiŶiŶg of the Ŷeed to fight the spƌead of CoŵŵuŶisŵ, aŶd of ͞ǁhat the gooks ǁould do 
to us͟, duƌiŶg his tiŵe iŶ VietŶaŵ, Mitchell (2004: 20-21) saw more similarities than 
differences between himself and these so-Đalled ͚gooks͛. As Mitchell (2004: 20-21) 
peƌĐeiǀed the situatioŶ, ͞VietŶaŵese fought foƌ theiƌ ĐouŶtƌǇ aŶd theiƌ ǁaǇ of life agaiŶst 
oǀeƌǁhelŵiŶg odds͟, just as he aŶd ŵaŶǇ of his Đolleagues, at that tiŵe at least, felt they 
were doing also. 
 
At the end of his first tour of duty in early 1967, Woody Kipp (2004: 39) immediately 
re-enlisted, a decision informed by his fondness for the Vietnamese people and culture. 
Upon his return to action, Kipp (2004: 35-40) availed himself of the hospitality of the 
Vietnamese locals. Like some other Native GIs, Kipp (2004: 40-41) even began a relationship 
with a VietŶaŵese giƌl, aŶd ƌoutiŶelǇ ǁeŶt AWOL iŶ oƌdeƌ to ďe eŶteƌtaiŶed at heƌ faŵilǇ͛s 
home (e.g. Wood, 2011: 75-79). Leroy TeCube (2000: 32 + 157-158) was the guest of honour 
oŶ a siŵilaƌ oĐĐasioŶ, a pƌiǀilege aĐĐoƌded to hiŵ ďeĐause ͞these people ĐoŶsideƌed ŵe a 
lot like theŵ͟ – a ǁaƌŵ seŶse of ƌeĐogŶitioŶ that ǁeŶt ďoth ǁaǇs. ͞The atŵospheƌe,͟ 
TeCube (2000: 157-ϭϱϴͿ ƌeĐalls, ͞ƌeŵiŶded ŵe of ŵǇ oǁŶ people͟, aŶd he ƌeĐogŶised a 
ĐeƌtaiŶ ƌesilieŶĐe iŶ the VietŶaŵese seŶse of huŵouƌ, aŶ ͞aďilitǇ to laugh duƌiŶg tiŵes of 
distƌess͟, that he felt was characteristic of his own Jicarilla community back in New Mexico.  
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Seminole-Navajo military advisor Ron Wood (2011: viii + 22 + 73-78), who looked so 
similar to the Vietnamese that he was apparently able, on occasion, to jokingly trick them 
into believing he was actually of Vietnamese origin himself, also related to theŵ ͞oŶ a ǀeƌǇ 
peƌsoŶal leǀel͟. Hoŵesick, and in need of cultural nourishment, he actively sought out the 
hospitality of the Vietnamese (Wood, 2011: 73-74 + 90-92). Wood (2011: 73-74 + 90-92) 
found a certain level of solace, a place of sanctuary in the midst of war, in the homes of 
these ͞hoŶest, haƌd ǁoƌkiŶg, ƌeseƌǀed ĐouŶtƌǇ people͟: 
I thought theǇ ǁeƌe ǀeƌǇ siŵilaƌ to ƌuƌal Naǀajos iŶ … theiƌ lifestǇles aŶd 
mannerisms. They would spread a table cloth on the floor and sit around the food to 
eat … a tƌaditioŶal Naǀajo Đustoŵ. TheǇ Đaƌed foƌ their land and livestock in a 
ŵaŶŶeƌ siŵilaƌ to Naǀajos …  
… I ǁeŶt to ďed that Ŷight, happǇ aŶd fulfilled iŶ aŶ eŵotioŶal seŶse. I felt like I had 
just had … diŶŶeƌ ǁith soŵe of ŵǇ ƌelatiǀes ďaĐk oŶ the … reservation. 
 
͞The VietŶaŵese didŶ͛t seeŵ so stƌaŶge to ŵe͟, WoodǇ Kipp ;ϮϬϬϰ: ϯϱͿ writes of 
similar eǆpeƌieŶĐes, ͞I ǁould listeŶ to theŵ talkiŶg … aŶd ǁish I Đould speak ǁith theŵ aŶd 
ask ƋuestioŶs aďout theiƌ liǀes.͟ What little he Đould uŶdeƌstaŶd of theiƌ Đultuƌe thƌough the 
pidgin English fascinated hiŵ, aŶd, ĐƌuĐiallǇ, seeŵed ͞soŵehoǁ faŵiliaƌ͟ – a sense of 
cultural recognition that was reciprocated by his new Vietnamese friends (Kipp, 2004: 39-
41).  
 
In some cases, Native servicemen came into contact with the indigenous peoples of 
Southeast Asia, some of whom still lived in tribal communities – a particularly meaningful 
encounter, considering the tribal origins of Native GIs themselves. Crow-Creek paratrooper 
Ray Leanna trained royalist guerrilla fighters in Laos in the early 1960s, at which time 
American military involvement in the region remained largely advisory and logistical (Carroll, 
2008: 146). LeaŶŶa͛s tƌaiŶees ǁeƌe ƌeĐƌuited fƌoŵ aŵoŶg the iŶdigeŶous Ka hill tƌiďesŵeŶ, 
who readily accepted him, based not only on his Asiatic physical appearance, but also, on a 
less superficial level, his tribal principles, to the extent that they essentially adopted him 
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into their culture, even offering him a – respectfully declined – local woman for his bride 
(Carroll, 2008: 146).  
 
Likewise, Cherokee paratrooper George Hoffman (quoted in Carroll, 2008: 160-162) 
desĐƌiďes ͞gettiŶg iŶ tight͟ ǁith a gƌoup of iŶdigeŶous Degaƌ people iŶ the VietŶaŵese 
highlaŶds as a ǁaǇ of ͞gettiŶg iŶ touĐh ǁith ŵǇ tƌiďal ƌoots͟. Befoƌe loŶg, he ǁas ŵiǆiŶg 
elements of Degar clothing with his military uniform, was given a band signifying official 
tribal membership, and was even given his own Degar name (Carroll, 2008: 160-162). 
Cherokee CIA operative D.L. Hicks was so profoundly affected by the time he spent among 
the indigenous Hmong of Laos that he would eventually go on to become involved in the 
movement to rescue and resettle Hmong refugees in the turbulent aftermath of Communist 
victory in Southeast Asia (Carroll, 2008: 139-140). 
 
For those involved in combat, these types of experiences were profoundly troubling. 
As documentary maker Patty Loeǁ puts it, foƌ Natiǀe GIs, theƌe ǁas aŶ ͞eǆtƌa laǇeƌ of guilt͟ 
in fighting and killing a group of people with whom they were beginning to identify (Way of 
the Warrior, 2007). ͞It ǁas fƌeakǇ͟, Jiŵ Noƌthƌup ;ϮϬϭϲͿ writes, ͞iŶ VietŶaŵ to shoot at 
those people and then to look at them because they had almost the same color skin, same 
color hair, and eyes … the spiƌit theǇ had of ŵakiŶg do ǁith ǁhat theǇ had; just like Indian 
people͟. ͞Afteƌ a ǁhile … I ĐouldŶ͛t figuƌe out ǁhǇ I ǁas shootiŶg at those people͟, 
Shoshone ex-infantryman Russell Redner (quoted in Stern, 1994: 28) recalls, ͞I started 
thinking I had more in common with them than with my side, who treated me like shit 
because I͛ŵ [Natiǀe].͟ 
 
Although sometimes impactful, for many Native servicemen, this reciprocal gaze of 
recognition remained relatively superficial. As members of a colonised and oppressed 
minority group, however, the more contact some Native GIs had with the similarly colonised 
and oppressed VietŶaŵese, iŶĐludiŶg theiƌ osteŶsiǀe ͚eŶeŵies͛, the ŵoƌe, it seeŵs, 
recognition of their physical and cultural likenesses led them to recognise much deeper 
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similarities. Apache Marine Ernie Dogwolf Lovato (2016), for instance, found common 
ground with the Vietnamese through participating in their spiritual customs. While serving 
in a Combined Action Program (CAP) unit alongside South Vietnamese troops, Lovato (2016) 
would sit and smoke opium with the Vietnamese villagers, who used the substance to 
induce a meditative state.  
 
Fƌoŵ Loǀato͛s ;ϮϬϭϲͿ peƌspeĐtiǀe, ǁhat went on in the opium dens felt similar to 
Apache spiritual practices, and while the Vietnamese taught him about their culture, he 
taught them about his own. Moreover, ͞when I started hallucinating͟, he writes, ͞the 
people around me … actually [became] my Indian people͟ (Lovato, 2016). Indeed, he seems 
to have found something of a sanctuary in these opium dens. As a consequence of such 
close contact, Lovato (2016Ϳ ǁƌites, ͞I ƌelated ŵoƌe to the VietŶaŵese … than to the 
AŵeƌiĐaŶs͟: 
The way they lived, the way they ate, and the way they survived with next to 
nothing. I felt a lot of compassion for the Vietnamese …, and I think a lot of people 
felt that maybe I was too compassionate. 
 
Lovato (2016) thus felt particularly uneasy about the way in which the US presence 
in Vietnam had introduced the people there to capitalism – indeed, he came to feel that the 
US was actively trying to change the culture of the Vietnamese, peddling a brand of cultural 
imperialism in Vietnam that was very similar to that imposed upon Natives throughout 
American history. Woody Kipp (1997: 211) shared these concerns, and felt that the ͞ǁhite 
iŶǀadeƌs͟ iŶ “outheast Asia ͞hated͟ the people of the ƌegioŶ not only on the grounds of 
their racial difference, but also because of their agricultural lifestyles and lack of 
technological advancement. ͞It took me a while to realize͟, he writes, ͞that the hatred and 
contempt the Americans felt towards the nontechnological Vietnamese peasants was the 
same hatred and contempt that had moved without conscience throughout the American 
West͟ (Kipp, 1997: 211).  
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The brutality of the American war effort in Southeast Asia was particularly disturbing 
to some Native GIs. Body-counts were used to measure the progress of the war effort, 
entire communities were forcibly displaced from their ancestral homelands, the US 
ŵilitaƌǇ͛s unprecedented reliance on bombing campaigns and chemical weapons made 
heavy civilian casualties effectively unavoidable, and even ground troops were often unable 
– and, in some cases, unwilling – to distinguish between enemy combatants and civilians 
(Cortright, 2005: 262; Fitzgerald, 2002: 370-376). As Jim Northrup describes it, the attitude 
developed by many servicemen in Vietnam, himself included, ǁas ͞if it ŵoǀed, shoot it, if it 
doesŶ͛t, ďuƌŶ it͟ (Way of the Warrior, 2007).  
 
The seemingly wanton destruction caused by the American war machine in 
Southeast Asia was an affront to the tribal sensibilities of some traditionally-minded Native 
GIs, who entered the military with very different ideas about warfare to those of most non-
Natives. In many North American tribes, traditional notions of warfare were more akin to 
contact sports, in which the object was often not on killing the enemy, but on outwitting 
them and achieving feats of courage that would earn certain cultural benefits back in their 
communities (Holm, 1992: 354-356). Death and destruction were not unknown, but they 
were recognised, in a spiritual sense, to be an interruption of the natural order (Holm, 1992: 
354-356).  
 
Having experienced what could arguably be described as the quintessential early 20th 
ĐeŶtuƌǇ Natiǀe upďƌiŶgiŶg, fƌoŵ his faŵilǇ͛s ͞ĐaŶǀas teŶt͟ oŶ the JiĐaƌilla ApaĐhe 
Reservation, NM, to the boarding school where he learned English as a second language, 
Leroy TeCube (2000: 107-108 + 210) was chosen to lead a combat platoon in Vietnam, and 
perceived his obligations from a traditional Jicarilla perspective, as those of a warrior, or 
Nahn Than:  
Only the very strong took on the responsibility. One had to set a good example and 
eŶsuƌe … the Ŷeeds of eǀeƌǇoŶe ... ǁeƌe ŵet ďefoƌe he thought of himself. He must 
never be corrupted or gain wealth from his position ... never retreat in battle and ... 
shoǁ a lot of Đouƌage. He had to ďe the fiƌst oŶe iŶto a ĐoŶfliĐt, aŶd if Ŷeed ďe … 
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fight single-handedly with an enemy leader ... In a sense, I was now a Nahn Tahn, 
although under circumstances different from the old days. However, I knew that the 
criteria would still apply, especially in battle. 
 
Here, TeCube (2000: 210) displays an awareness of the fact that traditional Native 
ideas about the responsibilities of warriors are not simply equivalent to modern ideas about 
those of US soldiers. Moreover, he can be seen to have recognised the fact that this was a 
very different kind of war in comparison to those to which his Jicarilla forebears might have 
been accustomed historically. However, he appears to have been determined to fulfil the 
terms of his role as a warrior, a Nahn Than, nonetheless, even if, as he claims, those around 
him had abandoned such virtues entirely (TeCube, 2000: 137 + 210). Accordingly, TeCube 
(2000: 137) refused to participate in looting or other abuses of civilians; activities in which 
he claims many of his colleagues engaged more freely.  
 
Others were entirely unable to reconcile their tribal principles with the brutality of 
the war. Holm (1989: 65) quotes a Native veteran who was disgusted by the violence he 
witnessed in Vietnam, especially in light of his own traditions:  
The first body I saw in Nam was a little kid. He was burnt up – Ŷapalŵ … Made ŵe 
siĐk. It tuƌŶed ŵe aƌouŶd. “ee, iŶ ouƌ ǁaǇ ǁe͛ƌe Ŷot supposed to kill ǁoŵeŶ aŶd 
ĐhildƌeŶ iŶ ďattle. The old people saǇ it͛s ďad ŵediĐiŶe aŶd killiŶg ǁoŵeŶ aŶd 
ĐhildƌeŶ doesŶ͛t pƌoǀe that Ǉou'ƌe ďƌaǀe. It͛s just the opposite.  
 
Woody Kipp (1997: 214) acknowledges the fact that Natives had always engaged in 
warfare throughout history, but felt that before the arrival of whites in the Americas and the 
introduction of non-Native, European approaches to waging war – i.e. aŶŶihilatioŶ oƌ ͚total 
ǁaƌ͛ – ͞theƌe ǁas still aŶ eleŵeŶt of hoŶoƌ, of the saŶĐtitǇ of life͟. ͞IŶ VietŶaŵ, iŶ Ǉouƌ [i.e. 
white American] war zoŶe,͟ Kipp ;ϭϵϵϳ: ϮϭϰͿ ĐoŶtiŶues, ͞theƌe ǁas Ŷo hoŶoƌ.͟  
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On a deeper level, Kipp (2004: 47) also noticed the technological disparities between 
the Vietnamese and US forces, and thereby formed a fundamental, historically-informed 
structure of ƌeĐogŶitioŶ. ͞As thousaŶds of ďullets, ďaĐked up ďǇ ĐaŶŶoŶ fiƌe, ƌaked the 
gƌouŶd,͟ he ǁƌites, ͞I ďegaŶ to ŵoƌe ĐleaƌlǇ Đoŵprehend what my people had faced in the 
AŵeƌiĐaŶ West ǁheŶ the ǁhites Đaŵe ǁith the GatliŶg guŶs͟ ;Kipp, ϮϬϬϰ: ϰϳͿ. Indeed, as 
Kipp (2004: 47) was beginning to realise, the racism and brutality of the American war effort 
in Vietnam was not unprecedented – it had happened before, on an even grander scale, 
back in the US.  
 
According to Kipp ;ϮϬϬϰ: ϯϱͿ, his ǁhite Đohoƌts, ͞like ǁhite soldieƌs [siŶĐe] the tiŵe 
of Coluŵďus … Đuƌsed the daƌk-skiŶŶed people as … iŶfeƌioƌ͟. His foŶdŶess foƌ the dark-
skinned people of Vietnam earned him the approbation of his superiors, and, while on hard-
labour duty as punishment for his frequent absences out in the villages, he witnessed what 
he perceived to be a racially motivated attack on an elderly Vietnamese man by a fellow, 
white, prison-labourer (Kipp, 2004: 43-46). This experience was a tipping point for Kipp 
(2004: 35 + 43-46), who began to see more clearly the parallels between the abuse of the 
Vietnamese and that of his own ancestors: 
What I had just witnessed was not waƌ ďut ƌaĐial hatƌed … MaŶǇ Ǉeaƌs lateƌ, afteƌ 
having joined the [Red Power movement] … I eǀeŶtuallǇ ƌealized that ǁhat I had 
seeŶ had … takeŶ plaĐe oǀeƌ aŶd oǀeƌ as the EuƌopeaŶs stoƌŵed iŶto … the 
American West. Other old men – my grandfathers – had suffered similar treatment 
at the haŶds of AŵeƌiĐaŶ soldieƌs … The legaĐǇ of that ŵisuŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg, that 
hatred, that prejudice, persists. 
 
Likewise, Dwight Birdwell (2000: 139) stƌuggled to ŵaiŶtaiŶ his faith iŶ the ǁaƌ͛s 
moral basis as he began to develop a similar sense of historical déjà vu: 
[T]hese so-called gooks were the people we were [supposed to be] fighting for, and 
ďleŶded iŶ ǁith all that ǁas the thought of old Đƌuelties iŶfliĐted upoŶ … IŶdiaŶs at 
the hands of the U.S. Army. Being of Cherokee heritage, I didn't want to turn around 
three or four generations later and perpetuate the same sort of abuse myself, 
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espeĐiallǇ ǁith people ǁho ǁeƌe pooƌ faƌŵeƌs just like ŵǇ people … aŶd ǁho iŶ 
some cases looked almost exactly like the Indians I knew back in Oklahoma. 
 
Here, we can see that Birdwell (2000: 139) had not only begun to perceive of the 
violence of the war in Vietnam as excessive and racist in nature, but that he was also 
forming two fundamental structures of recognition – not only that between the colonial 
histories of the Vietnamese and his own people, but also that between himself and the 
coloniser they held in common. Birdwell (2000: 139) and others like him were making the 
uncomfortable realisation that they themselves were now active agents in the colonial 
oppression of a people who had been colonised and racially denigrated in much the same 
way as the Native people of North America. Guy Dull Knife, Jr. (quoted in Rosier, 2009: 248), 
for instance, ͞often wondered if what we were doing to the VietŶaŵese ǁasŶ͛t the saŵe as 
ǁhat the [U“] aƌŵǇ had doŶe to us͟:  
We were kicking them out of their homes, killing their animals, herding them 
[aƌouŶd] … tƌǇiŶg to foƌĐe a goǀeƌŶŵeŶt aŶd a ǁaǇ of life oŶ theŵ that theǇ didŶ͛t 
really want.  
 
Another of the Native veterans quoted by Holm (1989: 65) drew much the same 
historical analogy:  
We ǁeŶt iŶto theiƌ ĐouŶtƌǇ … killed theŵ aŶd took laŶd that ǁasŶ͛t ouƌs. Just like 
what the whites did to us. I helped load up ville after ville and pack it off to the 
resettlement area. Just like when they moved us to the [reservations]. We shouldŶ͛t 
have done that. Browns against browns. That screwed me up, you know. 
 
To recall the terminology of Westmoreland and Chivington, the lice were not only 
beginning to identify with the termites, but also with the termite killers. These ideas 
naturally had a profound impact on the way some Natives felt about their roles as 
servicemen. Psychologist Robin LaDue (1983: 5) quotes another Native veteran for whom 
this experience was a major turning point:  
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OŶe daǇ, this VC pƌisoŶeƌ … poiŶted to ŵǇ skiŶ … haiƌ aŶd eǇes aŶd said '“aŵe, 
saŵe' … I hated hiŵ foƌ saǇiŶg this ďut oŶe daǇ, out oŶ patƌol, I ƌealized he ǁas 
right, that I had been a red man killing yellow men for the white man. I put my gun 
down and I couldn't kill anymore. There was no honor in what I had done. I had 
shamed myself and the gifts of courage and strength that had been given me. 
 
For LaDue͛s ;1983: 5) veteran, this experience was simply too powerful to ignore or 
brush off. He felt that, ďǇ peƌpetuatiŶg ƌaĐial ǀioleŶĐe, he had ͞shaŵed͟ himself, even going 
so far as to claim that his guilt in this respect was sufficient to force him to decide that he, 
the American Indian, could no longer conscionably continue to fight the Vietnamese Indian 
(LaDue, 1983: 5).  
 
One Creek-Cheƌokee ǀeteƌaŶ Ƌuoted ďǇ Holŵ ;ϭϵϵϲ: ϭϳϱͿ ͞ǁoke up oŶe ŵoƌŶiŶg … 
aŶd ƌealized that … I ǁas oŶ the ǁƌoŶg side of eǀeƌǇthiŶg I ǁaŶted to ďelieǀe I ǁas aďout͟. 
He was also painfully aware of the contradiction inherent in the fact that, while the US 
justified its presence in Vietnam – and its orders to GIs like himself to fight and kill the 
Vietnamese – by citing its treaties with foreign countries, it had showed no such 
commitment to its historical treaties with Native tribes – a perspective shared by Red Power 
activists back home (Banks, quoted in Wyant, 1970: 1B; Holm, 1996: 175). Going one further 
thaŶ his peeƌs, Holŵ͛s ;1996: 175Ϳ ǀeteƌaŶ Đaŵe to the ĐoŶĐlusioŶ that ͞I was fighting the 
wrong people͟. Like Woody Kipp (2004: 45-46), this individual began to feel that his true 
enemy was not the Vietnamese Communist insurgency, but the white-run US military, of 
which he himself was an increasingly reluctant agent (Holm, 1996: 175).  
 
In addition to their own first-hand observations and experiences, Native GIs were 
also exposed to outside, extra-military influences, which in some cases contributed towards 
their radicalisation. Indeed, many of those whose testimonies have been discussed above 
were serving at a time when minority discontent at social inequities in the US was boiling 
over into increasingly radical forms of protest against the American establishment. This 
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social upheaval then going on in the civilian world was not lost on Natives serving in the 
military.  
 
Oglala paƌatƌoopeƌ Bill MeaŶs͛ ;Ƌuoted iŶ Waltz, ϮϬϬϵͿ ͞jouƌŶeǇ to politiĐal aĐtiǀisŵ͟ 
began in Vietnam in the late 1960s. Means (quoted in Rosier, 2009: 265; quoted in Waltz, 
ϮϬϬϵͿ, ǁho desĐƌiďes his tiŵe iŶ seƌǀiĐe as a ͞politiĐal eduĐatioŶ͟, Đaŵe to feel, like soŵe of 
his peeƌs aďoǀe, that ͞I ǁas alŵost ďeĐoŵiŶg the ĐaǀalƌǇ, as opposed to ŵaiŶtaiŶiŶg ŵǇ 
Indian identity, and I realized that a lot of military tactics and policies used in Vietnam were 
the saŵe … used agaiŶst IŶdiaŶs iŶ the last ĐeŶtuƌǇ.͟  
 
Crucially, in the midst of this identity crisis, he experienced what scholars have 
ƌefeƌƌed to as the ͚ĐoŶtagioŶ effeĐt͛ – the idea that news of the social movement back 
home, whether received via the media or by word of mouth, could have a significant 
influence on the way in which GIs thought about their involvement in the war (Carbonella, 
2016: 126-ϭϮϴͿ. ͞IŶ ϭϵϲϴ,͟ MeaŶs ;Ƌuoted iŶ Waltz, ϮϬϬϵͿ ƌeĐalls, ͞I ƌead aďout [‘ed 
Poǁeƌ], aŶd I ƌealized … theƌe ǁas aŶ aĐtiǀe aŶd oƌgaŶized ŵoǀeŵeŶt of IŶdiaŶ people 
fightiŶg foƌ tƌeatǇ ƌights, Điǀil ƌights, aŶd huŵaŶ ƌights͟. “peakiŶg at a ƌeĐeŶt ĐoŶfeƌeŶĐe, 
Means (quoted in Norrell, 2013) added that, on one such occasion, he saw a picture of his 
own brother, Russell Means, at that time a rising luminary in the Red Power movement back 
home. From thereon out, Means was eager to get out of the military and join his brother 
(Norrell, 2013).  
 
Likewise, when another Oglala GI and future Red Power advocate, Z.G. Standing Bear 
(quoted in Nagel, 1995: 960), heard about Red Power protests while serving in Vietnam in 
ϭϵϲϵ, ͞I thought ͚‘ight oŶ! That͛s gƌeat ǁhat those guǇs aƌe doiŶg.͛͟ IŶ “taŶdiŶg Beaƌ͛s 
;Ƌuoted iŶ Nagel, ϭϵϵϱ: ϵϲϬͿ Đase, ǁe do Ŷot kŶoǁ the eǆaĐt souƌĐe of his ͚ĐoŶtagioŶ͛, ďut it 
was likely that, as iŶ MeaŶs͛ Đase, it Đaŵe through some form of print media. There were a 
great many underground newspapers in circulation among GIs around the world in the late 
1960s and early 1970s, many of which gave sympathetic coverage to the Red Power 
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movement, and, crucially, drew connections between the oppression of Natives and that of 
the Vietnamese (e.g. Anderson, 1970: 8; Liberated Barracks: Service News for Occupied 
Hawaii, 1972: 4; FTA with Pride, 1973: 6; Rip-Off: News for Asia, 1971: 11-12; Strategic 
Hamlet, 1970: 4 + 12).  
 
Some of these radical publications included contributions from Native GIs and 
veterans, who aired their complaints about military life and their radical ideas about the war 
while promoting the Red Power cause (e.g. Attitude Check, 1970; Barrage, 1972: 9-12; 
Blevins, 1969; The Bond, 1970b: 6; Fed Up!, 1971: 11). Others were aimed specifically at 
Natives, such as Akwesasne Notes, which was made free to all Native GIs in the hope that 
͞aŶǇ IŶdiaŶ iŶ the seƌǀiĐe ǁho ƌeads this papeƌ ǁill get ŵad eŶough to ƋuestioŶ ǁhat he is 
doiŶg͟ ;‘aƌihokǁats, Ƌuoted iŶ The Bond, 1971: 4-5). Most importantly, such publications 
outliŶed the ŵoǀeŵeŶt͛s needs in terms of support, and included details of how to get 
involved. Thus, the GI press not only provided Native servicemen who had begun to form 
radical ideas with more information and encouragement, but also gave them the chance to 
express those opinions, and to put them into action.  
 
During periods of leave, some Native GIs were exposed to more direct sources of 
͚ĐoŶtagioŶ͛. While on leave in Europe, Ron Wood (2011: 95 + 101-103) met American ex-
patriots who were draft-dodgers and advocates of the so-Đalled ͚hippǇ͛ ĐouŶteƌ-culture, and 
later, while visiting Japan, he was forced to confront the fervent anti-war and anti-American 
feelings that had developed among the people there in the decades since WWII. Both 
encounters had a profound impact on Wood (2011: 101-104), who began to think 
differently about what he was doing in Vietnam. ͞I had ďeĐoŵe ŵoƌe ĐƌitiĐal aďout 
American involvement in the ǁaƌ͟, he ǁƌites, ͞ŵǇ attitude had ĐhaŶged͟ ;Wood, ϮϬϭϭ: 
104).  
 
Those stationed in the US or back home on leave had, perhaps, the most direct 
exposure to radical outside influences. Woody Kipp (2004: 51), for instance, first came into 
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contact with hippies and anti-war protestors while between tours of duty at Camp 
PeŶdletoŶ, CA iŶ the suŵŵeƌ of ϭϵϲϳ. ͞GƌoǁiŶg up CatholiĐ … aŶd seƌǀiŶg iŶ the ŵaƌiŶes 
had ĐeŵeŶted soŵe ǀeƌǇ ĐoŶseƌǀatiǀe ideas iŶ ŵǇ ŵiŶd͟, Kipp ;ϮϬϬϰ: ϱϭ + ϲϬ-61) writes: 
Although I did not joiŶ the hippies …, ĐoŶĐepts of ŶoŶǀioleŶĐe aŶd aďhoƌƌeŶĐe to 
war began to take root within my consciousness [and] their message that summer 
never let go. I was beginning to understand that what I had seen and experienced in 
Vietnam was an atrocity against the huŵaŶ spiƌit … Whateǀeƌ potioŶ ǁas iŶĐitiŶg 
the anti-Vietnam protests, the civil rights marches, and the sexual revolution was 
also working on me. 
 
IŶ Kipp͛s ;2004: 51 + 60-61Ϳ Đase, this eǆpeƌieŶĐe of ͚ĐoŶtagioŶ͛ ǁas aŶ iŶtegƌal stage 
of a process of political radicalisation that, as we have seen, was also fuelled by structures of 
recognition formed in Vietnam – a process that, as we shall see, would eventually lead him 
into activism.  
 
During the 1969-1971 occupation of Alcatraz Island, CA by Red Power activists, one 
of the occupiers, Luwana Quitiquit (quoted in Smith & Warrior, 1996: 34), recognised the 
paradox inherent in the fact that her GI brother, then home on leave from Vietnam, came to 
offer her and another of their siblings moral support from the side-liŶes. ͞Heƌe he ǁas 
fightiŶg foƌ AŵeƌiĐa͟, she ƌepoƌtedlǇ stated, ͞To Đoŵe hoŵe aŶd suppoƌt us! It ǁas kiŶd of 
stƌaŶge to see hiŵ theƌe͟ ;QuitiƋuit, Ƌuoted iŶ “ŵith & Waƌƌioƌ, ϭϵϵϲ: ϯϰͿ. We do Ŷot kŶoǁ 
ǁhetheƌ QuitiƋuit͛s ;Ƌuoted iŶ “ŵith & Waƌƌioƌ, ϭϵϵϲ: ϯϰͿ ďƌotheƌ͛s suppoƌt foƌ the 
movement ever went beyond this gesture of familial solidarity, but his visit to Alcatraz must 
have had an influence on his psyche, especially in light of the significance of other such 
experiences, like that of Kipp (2004: 51 + 60-61) at Camp Pendleton (e.g. Anderson et al, 
1974: 194).  
 
For some Native GIs, the experiences outlined above had a profound and lasting 
ideological influence, one they would carry with them for the remainder of their tours, and 
beyond. Woody Kipp, Guy Dull Knife, Jr., and Bill Means, for instance, would later resurface 
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as Red Power activists after leaving the military, and their activities in this respect, as well as 
those of many other Native veterans, will be discussed in Chapter 3. As we shall see in 
Chapter 2, there were others who began to put their newly formed radical ideas into action 
while still in service.  
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(2) Dissenters 
 
As the war dragged on, the radical social movement raging among the civilian 
population in the US spilled over into the military, and morale and discipline among 
servicemen stationed in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, including the US itself, diminished to 
a sometimes mutinous extent (Cortright, 2005; Linden, 1972; Solis, 1989: 124). In 
increasingly high numbers, GIs engaged in various forms of dissent that ranged from shirking 
their duties and refusing to obey orders, to unauthorised absence (AWOL) and desertion, to, 
in more extreme cases, sabotage of military property and the violent assault or even murder 
of their own colleagues (Cortright, 2005; Fitzgerald, 2002: 422-423; Linden, 1972).  
 
There is little evidence available to us about Native GIs engaging in such radical 
dissent while serving in Southeast Asia or elsewhere outside of the US. Most of the Native 
GIs whose stories have been documented did not respond to the psychological influences 
outlined in Chapter 1 by developing radical ideas or engaging in subversive behaviour. Even 
those who did begin to develop dissenting opinions about the military and the war – which 
were, in some cases, sufficient to dissuade them from re-enlisting and pursuing military 
careers – generally kept such ideas to themselves (e.g. Benavidez, 2005: 81 + 167-173; 
Birdwell, 2000: 159-168; Cummings, 1998: 134-135 + 196-198 + 266; TeCube, 2000: 62 + 251 
+ 257-258). 
 
When Ron Wood (2011: 104 + 108) voiced his growing doubts about the morality of 
the war, his superiors intervened and were able to suppress his concerns, effectively nipping 
ǁhateǀeƌ suďǀeƌsiǀe opiŶioŶs he ŵight haǀe ďeeŶ deǀelopiŶg iŶ the ďud. ͞I [ǁas] Đhastised 
… ĐouŶselled … eŶĐouƌaged to ďe pƌofessioŶal … haǀe a positiǀe attitude aŶd fiŶish out ŵǇ 
touƌ iŶ a good ǁaǇ͟, he ƌeĐalls, ͞I took [these] ǁoƌds to heaƌt aŶd tƌied to thiŶk positiǀe 
thoughts aďout ŵǇ situatioŶ [theƌeafteƌ]͟ ;Wood, ϮϬϭϭ: ϭϬϰ + ϭϬϴͿ. Danny Bruner (1988a: 
114-115) came to regret his own decision not to join in a more conspicuous act of dissent. 
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͞OŶe guǇ, a ĐitǇ ďlaĐk, … told the lieuteŶaŶt … he͛d had eŶough … thƌeǁ doǁŶ his ƌifle aŶd 
[left] oŶ a ƌesupplǇ Đhoppeƌ͟, BƌuŶeƌ ;ϭϵϴϴa: ϭϭϰ-115) recalls:  
I remember thinking he was a troublemaker and a coward, but soon I realized he 
ǁas ƌight. He ǁas stƌeetǁise, he uŶdeƌstood death aŶd ǁaƌ; he͛d seeŶ it ďaĐk hoŵe. 
I ǁas just a little … IŶdiaŶ ďoǇ … plaǇiŶg at ǁaƌ, tƌǇiŶg to ďe a heƌo. His ǁeƌe the 
words of wisdom. 
 
Others admit actively breaking the rules while in service, but not with the intention 
of making a statement of dissent or resistance. A particularly common admission, for 
instance, is that of going AWOL, in some cases on numerous occasions and for considerable 
periods of time, but most Native GIs who engaged in such behaviour did so for reasons that 
were unrelated to the types of psychological turmoil and ideological change outlined in 
Chapter 1, and, thus, cannot be seen as expressions of dissent (e.g. Mitchell, 2004: 45-65; 
Walkabout, quoted in Bedard, 1998: 61 + 64-65).  
 
There were exceptions, of course. No stranger to the brig, Woody Kipp (2004: 40-42) 
spent the final weeks of his second tour in Vietnam locked-up as punishment for his many 
unauthorised absences out among the loĐal ǀillageƌs. Kipp͛s ;ϮϬϬϰ: ϰϮͿ supeƌioƌs, ǁho 
suspeĐted that he ǁas at ƌisk of ͞goiŶg Ŷatiǀe͟, eǀeŶtuallǇ deĐided he had speŶt loŶg 
enough in Vietnam, prevented him from re-enlisting for a third tour, and sent him home.  
 
In early 1968, one stateside GI newspaper drew attention to the similar case of a 
Natiǀe dƌaftee, ideŶtified oŶlǇ as ͞Pǀt. Nash͟, appaƌeŶtlǇ statioŶed iŶ Caŵ ‘aŶh BaǇ oŶ the 
southeast coast of Vietnam, who had recently been sentenced to six-ŵoŶths͛ haƌd laďouƌ 
for threatening to kill two of his superiors (The Bond, 1968: 4). According to the article, Nash 
felt ͞eǆtƌeŵelǇ ďitteƌ͟ aďout having grown up on an impoverished reservation, especially 
after the government added insult to injury and drafted him into the Army (The Bond, 1968: 
4). Nash had also formed structures of recognition, and, like Kipp (2004: 42), his affection for 
the Vietnamese attracted the ire of his superiors.  
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͞He Đould easilǇ ideŶtifǇ ǁith the VietŶaŵese … liǀiŶg iŶ ďaƌƌiĐaded ǀillages,͟ ǁe aƌe 
told, ͞so ǁheŶ he began to spend more time with them than in his own tent, his platoon 
leadeƌs tƌied to puŶish hiŵ ǁith a GI haiƌĐut͟ ;The Bond, 1968: 4). We are not told which 
tribe Nash had grown up in, but, in many tribal cultures, hair is sacred, and the threat of 
having it sheered off under duress is a traumatic prospect – heŶĐe, peƌhaps, Nash͛s outďuƌst 
(Waldman, 2009: 76). The dismissive attitudes of military officials towards Native customs, 
including prohibitions against culturally significant hair-styles and clothing, appear to have 
been common complaints among Native GIs (e.g. 1st of the Worst, 1970: 2; Amex->Canada, 
1973: 19; Barrage, 1972: 10).  
 
In early 1972, an appeal surfaced in the GI press from a Native serviceman known as 
Red Sun, who had also fallen foul of military policy concerning hair length while serving on 
an Air Force base in Japan (The 1st Amendment, 1972: 4; Omega Press, 1972: 11). In 
response to what he saw as the abuse of his religious freedoms, Red Sun (quoted in The 1st 
Amendment, 1972: 4) – originally Michael Smith – began to go by his tribal name, and 
declared that he had taken it upon himself to raise awareness about the ͞disĐƌiŵiŶatioŶ aŶd 
ŵoƌal iŶjustiĐe͟ that Native GIs had to endure. ͞[U]ŶfoƌtuŶatelǇ͟, ‘ed “uŶ ;Ƌuoted iŶ The 
1st Amendment, ϭϵϳϮ: ϰͿ ǁƌote, ͞I'ŵ fightiŶg aloŶe͟: 
I am in great need of hearing from my brothers and sisters in other services no 
ŵatteƌ ǁheƌe Ǉou aƌe … We ŵust ŵake ĐoŶtaĐt … so that although ǁe aƌe 
sepaƌated ďǇ a gƌeat ŵaŶǇ ŵiles, ǁe ĐaŶ ĐoŵŵuŶiĐate … to ŵake the basis of our 
revolution and regain our souls that have been repressed by the military. 
 
The fuŶdaŵeŶtal ďasis of this ͞ƌeǀolutioŶ͟, ‘ed “uŶ ;Ƌuoted iŶ The 1st Amendment, 
ϭϵϳϮ: ϰͿ deĐlaƌed, ǁas that ͞IŶdiaŶ people should haǀe Ŷo paƌt iŶ Ŷoƌ haǀe to put up with 
the atƌoĐities of the Aƌŵed FoƌĐes.͟ As suĐh, ‘ed “uŶ͛s ŵessage ǁas effeĐtiǀelǇ a Đall foƌ a 
coordinated, international movement of Native GIs who would be willing to stand together 
and oppose the conduct of the US military towards both its own Native personnel and the 
Vietnamese.  
  30 
 
During the occupation of Wounded Knee, SD by Red Power activists in 1973, the 
occupiers received a phone-call from a group of twelve Native GIs then serving with the 
Army in Vietnam who expressed their desire to participate (Banks & Erdoes, 2011: 190; 
Zimmerman, 1976: ϮϯϯͿ. ͞TheǇ told us … theǇ ƌealized Ŷoǁ that the ƌeal ǁaƌ ǁas at hoŵe,͟ 
a leadiŶg oĐĐupieƌ said, ͞that theǇ haǀe Ŷo ďusiŶess fightiŶg oǀeƌ oŶ soŵeďodǇ else͛s 
property in some foreign country, and that theǇ ǁished … theǇ ǁeƌe theƌe at WouŶded 
KŶee͟ ;BaŶks, Ƌuoted iŶ )iŵŵeƌŵaŶ, 1976: 233).  
 
The group must have been on leave to be able to get together and make the call, and 
this might be taken as an indication that, while on leave, Natives serving abroad were 
sometimes able to organise, albeit in a very modest sense, to engage in subversive 
behaviour specific to the interests of their own demographic. As Hunkpapa Marine John 
Luke Flyinghorse (2016) observed, Native GIs serving in Vietnam, whenever possible, 
͞alǁaǇs looked eaĐh otheƌ up, Ŷo ŵatteƌ ǁhat tƌiďe ǁe ǁeƌe fƌoŵ.͟ GeŶeƌallǇ, hoǁeǀeƌ, 
Native servicemen, being in the extreme minority and rarely serving in close proximity to 
one another, appear to have been unable to establish even small-scale local groups, let 
aloŶe the kiŶd of iŶteƌŶatioŶal Ŷetǁoƌk hiŶted at iŶ ‘ed “uŶ͛s ;Ƌuoted iŶ The 1st 
Amendment, 1972: 4) appeal.  
 
Dǁight Biƌdǁell͛s ;& Nolan, 2000: 126) aforementioned encounter with Black Power 
advocates, and the general acceptance of Natives into Chicano social groups, indicates that, 
in some cases, Native GIs stationed abroad may have been able to join in with the radical 
activities of black and Chicano groups. Natives were also almost certainly – if only on the 
grounds of statistical inevitability – involved with some of the larger multi-ethnic 
organisations of radical GIs, as well as some of the major mutinies and GI protest events of 
the era, but the primary evidence that would give us an idea of their numbers, or allow us to 
better understand their involvement, is not forthcoming.  
 
  31 
In relation to Native GIs serving back in the States, on the other hand, there is much 
more evidence available to us. Moreover, this evidence indicates that, within the US at 
least, ‘ed “uŶ͛s (quoted in The 1st Amendment, 1972: 4) vision of a coordinated Native GI 
resistance movement was, if only for a brief moment, realised. While the war itself was no 
more popular among Natives than among other demographics, draft-evasion and other 
forms of resistance to military authority were frowned upon, and particularly uncommon, 
likely because military service was an important, even essential, element of many tribal 
cultures, having become intertwined over the centuries with older, traditional conceptions 
of warriorhood and rights of passage (Carroll, 2008: 147-150; Holden, quoted in Lemay, 
2012; Holm, 1996: 23 + 117-122).  
 
In a 1968 interview, Spirit Lake Native rights advocate Alvina Alberts (quoted in 
Gershen, 1968: 14) gave voice to the prevailing opinion in Indian Country concerning 
military service. Alberts (quoted in Gershen, 1968: 14) stated that she, as the mother of 
three servicemen, one of whom had recently been killed in Vietnam, had thereby earned 
her role as a spokeswoman for her people, and expressed her romantic, but commonly held, 
opinion that Native military service was somehow a continuation or modern equivalent of 
tribal warrior traditions: 
I͛ŵ Ŷot ďitteƌ aďout ŵǇ ďoǇ dǇiŶg … He died foƌ a good Đause … You see, ǁe haǀe Ŷo 
IŶdiaŶ dƌaft dodgeƌs oƌ IŶdiaŶs ǁ[h]o ďuƌŶ dƌaft Đaƌds. WheŶ it͛s tiŵe to go, Ǉou go. 
Just like in the old days when the chief said it was time to go on the warpath and the 
young men went. 
 
The ͞good Đause͟ to ǁhiĐh Alďeƌts ;Ƌuoted iŶ GeƌsheŶ, ϭϵϲϴ: ϭϰͿ ǁas ƌefeƌƌiŶg heƌe 
ǁas Ŷot the VietŶaŵ Waƌ itself, ďut, ƌatheƌ, heƌ soŶ͛s fulfilŵeŶt of ǁhat she saǁ as the 
obligation of a Native warrior to aŶsǁeƌ the Đall of dutǇ. Hoǁeǀeƌ, Alďeƌts͛ ;Ƌuoted iŶ 
Gershen, 1968: 14) romantic sentiments about military service, though very common among 
Natives, were not universal, and her assertions were not entirely correct (Two Hawk, quoted 
in McKenna, 1972: 9). As we have seen, not all Native GIs and veterans were proud of what 
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they were doing or had done in Southeast Asia, and some of those who had yet to serve 
there did not relish the prospect.  
 
Contrary to prevailing opinion, some reservation communities reportedly provided 
sanctuary to draft-evaders throughout the war (Ann Arbor Sun, 1976: 26). At the so-called 
͚Spring Mobilization͛ in New York City in April 1967, during which Martin Luther King, Jr. 
famously first spoke out against the war, a one hundred-stƌoŶg ͞ĐoŶtiŶgeŶt͟ of Natiǀes 
came from the Rosebud Reservation, SD to demonstrate their opposition to the war and the 
drafting of Natives to fight in it (Hunt, 2001: 6-7; Roundup of Nationwide Mobilization 
Activity, ϭϵϲϳ: ϱ; “oƌiŶ, ϭϵϲϳ: ϭϰͿ. ͞The ŵoƌe I see of [U“] poliĐǇ toǁaƌds … VietŶaŵ,͟ theŶ-
Rosebud tribal chairman Robert Burnette (quoted in Roundup of Nationwide Mobilization 
Activity, ϭϵϲϳ: ϱͿ deĐlaƌed, ͞the ŵoƌe it ƌeŵiŶds ŵe of the ǁaǇ IŶdiaŶs eŶded up oŶ 
reservations. We know now that our battleground is here in our motherland.͟  
 
Individual cases of Native GIs who resisted being sent to fight in Southeast Asia also 
surfaced in the press, such as that of Shoshone draftee Richard Williams, who defied orders 
to ship out to Vietnam in mid-1967. Facing court-martial, Williams turned to his tribal 
council, some of whom agreed to back his cause (Berkeley Barb, 1967a: 3). In the process, 
the Shoshone leaders took the opportunity to raise their issues with the conscription of 
Natives more generally, which, like many throughout Indian Country, they believed to be an 
illegal breach of historic treaties made between Native tribes and the US (Berkeley Barb, 
1967a: 3; Six Nations Iroquois Confederacy, 2015: 160).  
 
Williaŵs͛ deĐisioŶ to staŶd agaiŶst the “eleĐtiǀe “eƌǀiĐe authoƌities eaƌŶed hiŵ the 
support of radicals, Native and non-Native alike, from across the country, and the services of 
J.B. Tietz, an attorney who specialised in defending conscientious objectors, were secured 
by a Los Angeles-based pro-Red Power organisation called the Traditional Indian Land and 
Life Committee (Berkeley Barb, 1967b: 7; Berkeley Barb, 1967c: 7). ͞[A] tƌeatǇ IŶdiaŶ͟, the 
defence declared, ͞is Ŷeitheƌ a ĐitizeŶ of the UŶited “tates Ŷoƌ a ƌesideŶt alieŶ ǁithiŶ the 
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ŵeaŶiŶg of [the] UŶiǀeƌsal MilitaƌǇ TƌaiŶiŶg aŶd “eƌǀiĐe AĐt͟ ;Sarasota Journal, 1967: 9). 
Thus, Williams (quoted in Sarasota Journal, 1967: 9) argued, he and other Native draftees 
should never have been conscripted in the first place, let alone be compelled to go into a 
warzone.  
 
Crucially, this argument echoed those being made by Red Power advocates 
concerning other disputes between Natives and the government over such contentious 
issues as the rights to land and resources. If the federal courts would not uphold what he 
saǁ as the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s eŶd of the tƌeaties, Williaŵs ;Ƌuoted iŶ St. Petersburg Times, 1967: 
2A) threatened to take his Đase to the UN, ͞to tell ǁhat the ǁhite ŵaŶ has doŶe to the 
AŵeƌiĐaŶ IŶdiaŶ.͟ In concluding his testimony, Williams (quoted in Berkeley Barb, 1967c: 7) 
reportedly told the ďoaƌd offiĐeƌ, ͞I͛ŵ aŶ AŵeƌiĐaŶ IŶdiaŶ aŶd Ǉou͛ƌe staŶdiŶg oŶ ŵǇ laŶd, 
ďoǇ.͟ 
 
By relying on the idea that Natives were not properly US citizens, however, Williams 
and his supporters were bound to fail, because in the eyes of the government all Natives 
were citizens, and had been since 1924 (News Notes of the Central Committee for 
Conscientious Objectors, 1967: 2). Consequently, Williams lost the case, and was sentenced 
to five-Ǉeaƌs͛ haƌd laďouƌ ;Berkeley Barb, 1967a: 3; St. Petersburg Times, 1967: 2A). 
Although his attempt to challenge the Selective Service system had failed, Williaŵs͛ case 
had briefly drawn the attention of both the mainstream and radical medias to Native ideas 
about conscription, and his supporters vowed to continue his campaign against the draft 
(Berkeley Barb, 1967a: 3; Smith, 2012: 82).  
 
The most well-known Native GI to publicly raise his objections to the war and his 
complaints about the military during his time in service was not a draftee, but an enlisted 
man – Yakima-Cherokee paratrooper Sid Mills. Over the course of nearly two-and-a-half 
years of service, Mills (quoted in Rosier, 2009: 244) had developed moral doubts about the 
ǁaƌ, aŶd ǁould lateƌ Đlaiŵ to haǀe ǁitŶessed aŶd heaƌd aďout ͞ŵaŶǇ MǇ Lais͟ ǁhile seƌǀiŶg 
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iŶ VietŶaŵ. ͞[I]t͛s Ŷot aŶ iŶǀadiŶg aƌŵǇ ǁe͛ƌe huƌtiŶg͟, he stated, ͞It͛s the ǁoŵeŶ aŶd 
espeĐiallǇ the ĐhildƌeŶ ǁe͛ƌe outƌight ŵuƌdeƌiŶg͟ ;Ƌuoted iŶ ‘osieƌ, ϮϬϬϵ: ϮϰϰͿ.  
 
While on medical leave at Fort Lewis, WA in 1968, Mills͛ eǇes ǁeƌe opeŶed to ǁhat 
had been happening while he was away. Tribes in the Pacific Northwest were engaged in a 
struggle with local authorities for the right to engage in traditional fishing practices – a right 
that had, they argued, been secured by historic treaties (Wilkinson, 2006). Mills (1999: 24-
25) had friends and family in the movement, many of whom, including women and children, 
he soon learned, had been arrested and brutalised by the authorities while he had been 
away fighting in Vietnam.  
 
Mills͛ fƌieŶd aŶd felloǁ Yakiŵa GI ‘iĐhaƌd “ohappǇ, ǁho at the tiŵe of Mills͛ ƌeturn 
was back in Vietnam serving his third tour of duty there, had racked up an extensive criminal 
record for his involvement with fishing rights protests (Fisher, 2010: 221-223; Mills, 1999: 
24). Mills (1999: 23-24) felt that there was a disconnect between the fact that a decorated 
combat veteran, who had risked his life in service of the US, would return home only to be 
beaten and jailed by the police for trying to serve his family and community through what 
he believed were legitimate, treaty-assured, meaŶs. Mills͛ alƌeady fragile allegiance to the 
ŵilitaƌǇ ǁas ďeiŶg stƌaiŶed to ďƌeakiŶg poiŶt. ͞It ǁas a ŵatteƌ of ǁoƌkiŶg foƌ a goǀeƌŶŵeŶt 
that ǁas oppƌessiŶg Ǉou͟, he lateƌ stated, ͞It didŶ't ŵake aŶǇ seŶse͟ ;Mills, Ƌuoted iŶ 
Johansen, 2013: 192).  
 
Moreover, at the tiŵe of Mills͛ ƌetuƌŶ, Foƌt Leǁis was developing into a major centre 
of the GI movement in the US, and it is likely that he was exposed to the subversive 
influence of other radical GIs on the base, and that, in turn, he, as a veteran, might have 
exerted an even more powerful influence on those around him – the ͚ĐoŶtagioŶ effeĐt͛ 
worked both ways (Carbonella, 2016: 128; Cortright, 2005: 76-77 + 85-86). Indeed, as a 
wounded combat veteran, Mills͛ supeƌioƌs ǁould likelǇ have considered him to be 
particularly dangerous in terms of the subversive influence that men like himself could have 
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on younger, less experienced GIs – in some cases, GIs who were yet to be sent abroad were 
told to stay away from combat veterans when they returned from the war, and the influx of 
these traumatised, and often embittered, individuals has been connected to increases in 
radicalism on Stateside bases (Cortright, 2005: 27 + 85-86 + 247).  
 
In response to his surroundings, Mills (1999: 22-ϮϯͿ ǁas ŵoǀed to ŵake ͞a deĐisioŶ 
of ĐoŶsĐieŶĐe, of ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt aŶd allegiaŶĐe͟. OŶ OĐtoďeƌ ϭϯ, ϭϵϲϴ, he issued an important 
statement, one that would transform him into what one contemporary GI newspaper called 
͞a sǇŵďol of GI stƌuggle foƌ IŶdiaŶs͟ ;Column Left, 1970: 21). Mills (1999: 22-26) severed 
whatever loyalties he still had to the Army, effectively declared he would not be returning to 
Vietnam, and announced that his moral obligations were now for the movement, and the 
ŵoǀeŵeŶt oŶlǇ. ͞I ƌeŶouŶĐe, aŶd Ŷo loŶgeƌ ĐoŶsideƌ ŵǇself uŶdeƌ, the … juƌisdiĐtioŶ of the 
U.“. AƌŵǇ͟, Mills ;ϭϵϵϵ: ϮϯͿ deĐlaƌed:  
I have served the United States in a less compelling struggle in Vietnam and will not 
be restricted from doiŶg less foƌ ŵǇ people … The U.“. ǁould haǀe aĐĐepted saĐƌifiĐe 
of ŵǇ life iŶ VietŶaŵ iŶ a less legitiŵate Đause … Yet I haǀe ŵǇ life aŶd aŵ Ŷoǁ 
pƌepaƌed to staŶd iŶ aŶotheƌ ďattle … I haǀe giǀeŶ eŶough to the U.“. AƌŵǇ – I now 
choose to serve my people. 
 
Mills soon became an important local icon of both Red Power and GI resistance. In 
early 1969, he spoke at a number of radical GI gatherings in the Seattle/Tacoma area (Smith, 
2012: 178Ϳ. OŶe suĐh eǀeŶt ǁas the ͚AŶti-ǁaƌ BasiĐ TƌaiŶiŶg DaǇs͛, a ĐoŶfeƌeŶĐe organised 
by the GI-Civilian Alliance for Peace (GI-CAP), held from April 5-6, 1969 at the Moore 
Theater in Seattle, where Mills spoke alongside more seasoned radicals from groups like the 
Black Panthers and the Young Socialist Alliance (Counterpoint!, 1969: 4). The content of 
Mills͛ ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶ to the GI-CAP conference is, unfortunately, unrecorded, so we cannot 
know for sure whether or not he brought up Native issues, but, given his reasons for leaving 
the Army, and the way in which he is referred to in pƌess Đoǀeƌage of the eǀeŶt as ͞aŶ IŶdiaŶ 
ƌights fighteƌ͟, it is ǀeƌǇ likelǇ that he did ;Huachuca Hard Times, 1969: 5; The Student 
Mobilizer, 1969: 2).  
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“till aŶ aĐtiǀe GI ǁheŶ he eŶteƌed the ŵoǀeŵeŶt, Mills͛ iŶǀolǀeŵeŶt iŶ fishiŶg ƌights 
protests soon attracted the attention of military authorities, and he eventually found 
himself in the Fort Lewis stockade on AWOL charges, a reminder that, although he might 
have considered his commitments to the Army null and void, the Army itself did not – he 
would ultimately have to wait until mid-1970 before he could obtain a satisfactory discharge 
(Adams, 2011b: 185; The Bond, 1969: 3; Eugene-Register Guard, 1972: 10A; Johansen, 2013: 
192). Undeterred, Mills was soon working closely alongside one of the de facto leaders of 
the fishing rights movement, Hank Adams, who was himself a reluctant veteran of the 
Vietnam era.  
 
When Adams had been drafted back in early 1964, he was already involved in Red 
Power activism in the Pacific Northwest, and attempted to resist conscription, arguing that, 
while their treaty rights went unrecognised, Natives should not be forced to serve in the 
armed forces (Gridley, 1972: 4; Johansen, 2013: 3). His stance was unpopular with the local 
tribal establishments, and contributed towards their official disavowal of he and his fellow 
fishing rights activists, who were already seen as dangerous, fringe figures by many tribal 
leaders (Olson, 1984: 212).  
 
Adams ultimately lost his fight, and served in the Army for two years (Johansen, 
2013: 3). After returning from service, Adams͛ (2011a: 64-65; 2011b: 185-186) 
determination had only increased, and he continued to consider the issues surrounding the 
war, especially the drafting of Natives to fight in it, as inextricably connected to his work 
with the fishing rights protests and the wider Red Power movement (Gridley, 1972: 4-5 + 7-
8). Over the following years, he continued to back Native efforts to resist the draft, most 
notably that of the Puyallup tribe, who, in 1970, passed an ordinance prohibiting the 
conscription of Puyallup men on the grounds that they should not be compelled to serve a 
government that was neglecting and abusing their people – much the same grounds as 
those oŶ ǁhiĐh Adaŵs͛ oǁŶ Đase had earlier rested (Adams, 2011a: 64-65; Gridley, 1972: 4-
5).  
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Throughout the 1960s, such cases of Native draft-resistance and dissent within the 
military were few and far between (Smith, 2012: 82). They were not coordinated, and do 
not appear to have been part of a national, or even regional, Native GI resistance 
movement. As the conflict in Southeast Asia dragged on, however, opposition to the war 
became more widespread, and, by the end of the decade, the Red Power movement had 
begun to make its presence felt on a national stage, sending a wave of renewed pride in 
Native identity and culture across the country (Morningstorm, 2004: xvi). In this changing 
social climate, a more coordinated network of dissenting Native GIs, who endorsed Red 
Power ideas alongside a more general resistance to military and state authority, as well as 
the war itself, emerged in the Pacific Northwest.  
 
Around the time Sid Mills was making his first forays into Red Power and GI activism, 
Wasco draftee and fellow Fort Lewis GI Deni Leonard (quoted in Fed Up!, 1970a: 4) was a 
͞faiƌlǇ guŶg ho ƌeĐƌuit͟ iŶ ďasiĐ tƌaiŶiŶg. CoŶfƌoŶted ǁith tƌaiŶiŶg filŵs that he felt glorified 
the Indian Wars, Leonard (quoted in Fed-Up, 1970a: 4) soon changed his tune, and formed a 
structure of recognition, concluding that Natives and Vietnamese had been treated similarly 
by the US military, and deciding that he could not conscionably go to fight other oppressed 
non-white people (The Bond, 1970a: 1 + 3). He raised these issues with superiors, but his 
protestations were repressed, and when he was ordered to ship out to Vietnam, he 
deserted (The Bond, 1970a: 1 + 3; Leonard, quoted in Fed-Up, 1970a: 4). Eventually court-
martialled, Leonard turned to the treaty argument – once again, it failed, and he was 
sentenced to six months in the stockade at the Presidio, in San Francisco, CA (Leonard, 
quoted in Fed-Up, 1970a: 4).  
 
On January 21, 1970, Leonard, now free from prison and a committed organiser for 
GI resistanĐe, pƌiŵaƌilǇ ǁith the Foƌt Leǁis Đhapteƌ of the AŵeƌiĐaŶ “eƌǀiĐeŵeŶ͛s UŶioŶ 
;A“UͿ, ͞testified͟ agaiŶst the AƌŵǇ at a ŵoĐk-trial staged by dissenting GIs in Tacoma, WA 
(The Bond, 1970: 1 + 3; Fed-Up, 1970a: 4). Leonard (quoted in The Bond, 1970: 1; quoted in 
Fed-Up, 1970a: 4) explained his reasons for refusing to go to Vietnam, again drawing 
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connections between contemporary and historic aĐts of ͞geŶoĐide͟ Đoŵŵitted agaiŶst 
Vietnamese and Natives respectively. He also told of his harrowing experiences in the 
Pƌesidio stoĐkade, aŶd of ŵeetiŶg the ͚Pƌesidio Ϯϳ͛, a faŵous gƌoup of GI aŶti-war 
protestors, to whom he apparently explained the structures of recognition he had formed 
during service (Leonard, quoted in Fed-Up, ϭϵϳϬa: ϰͿ. ͞[The U“ AƌŵǇ] ǁiped out a lot of my 
people aŶd staƌted takiŶg theiƌ laŶd͟, LeoŶaƌd ;Ƌuoted iŶ Fed-Up, ϭϵϳϬa: ϰͿ told theŵ, ͞AŶd 
I thought, I͛ŵ ďeiŶg used to ǁipe out otheƌ people aŶd take theiƌ laŶd.͟  
 
 ͞A juƌǇ of … aĐtiǀe-dutǇ soldieƌs͟, ǁe aƌe told, ͞fouŶd the ŵilitaƌǇ ͚guiltǇ͛ oŶ charges 
of geŶoĐide, Đƌiŵes agaiŶst huŵaŶitǇ aŶd ǀiolatioŶs of soldieƌs͛ ƌights͟ ;The Bond, 1970a: 1). 
The sentence was ͞death͟, and Leonard soon began efforts to carry it out, defying his 
supeƌioƌs͛ atteŵpts to ƌepƌess disseŶt ďǇ holdiŶg a ŵeetiŶg ǁith fellow Fort Lewis GIs about 
the results of the trial (Rader, 1970: 3). What is more, all those involved in the mock-trial 
had ͞stƌessed theiƌ sǇŵpathǇ͟ foƌ the VietŶaŵese – not only the civilian populace, but also 
the Communist insurgents – and this too was soon acted upon (The Bond, 1970a: 1).  
 
On January 31, in Vancouver, Canada, a group of Fort Lewis ASU members met and 
exchanged gestures of friendship with delegates from the Vietnamese National Liberation 
Front – representatives of one of the US military͛s pƌiŶĐiple eŶeŵies iŶ “outheast Asia, the 
͚Viet CoŶg͛ ;Rader, 1970: 3). We are not told whether Leonard went with them, but, as a 
leading figure in the Fort Lewis ASU, he was almost certainly involved. In less than a year, 
then, Leonard had gone from enteƌiŶg the AƌŵǇ as a ͚guŶg ho͛ ƌeĐƌuit, to being willing to 
engage in – or at least associate himself with – one of the most radical, near-treasonous, 
acts of intra-military dissent imaginable, all as a result of him forming structures of 
recognition, and all without even setting foot in Southeast Asia.  
 
In the February 26, 1970 issue of Fed Up!, a GI newspaper produced by the Fort 
Lewis ASU, LeoŶaƌd ;ϭϵϳϬa: ϴͿ issued ͞aŶ appeal to all ŵǇ GI IŶdiaŶ Bƌotheƌs to ĐoŶsideƌ 
who you are and how tragic a situation ǁe aƌe Ŷoǁ a paƌt [of]͟: 
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The winning of the West meant the Genocide of the American Indian. The winning of 
VietŶaŵ ŵeaŶs the GeŶoĐide of the VietŶaŵese … Ouƌ people ǁeƌe ŵuƌdeƌed ďǇ 
this very Army we are now serving with! Is there an alternative? Can we somehow 
stop ǁoƌkiŶg foƌ these Killeƌs aŶd staƌt ǁoƌkiŶg foƌ ouƌ INDIAN PEOPLE. I doŶ͛t haǀe 
aŶǇ pƌide seƌǀiŶg iŶ the … AƌŵǇ aŶd feel … iŵpƌisoŶed [at] Ft. Leǁis. ‘efuse to ďe 
Brain-ǁashed iŶto ďelieǀiŶg Ǉou͛ƌe pƌoteĐtiŶg the ĐouŶtƌǇ the AƌŵǇ foƌĐiďlǇ stole 
from you. 
 
At the foot of his appeal, and again during a speech at Fort Lewis two days later, 
Leonard (1970a: 8) announced the foundation of a Fort Lewis-based, all-Native organisation 
called Hey-Tra-Sneyo1, or the Indian GI Resistance Movement, formed earlier that month 
with the objective of advising and assisting all Native servicemen (Fed Up!, 1970b: 2; 
Liberation News Service, 1970: 7).  
 
In the April 15 issue of Fed Up! (1970b: 6), an unnamed spokesperson – most likely 
Leonard, who was a student prior to being drafted, a capable writer, and a regular 
contributor to ASU publications – laid out Hey-Tra-“ŶeǇo͛s Đoƌe philosophǇ. AĐĐoƌdiŶg to 
this article, a manifesto of sorts, the organisation stood in opposition to racism and 
imperialism, and advocated for the preservation of Native treaty rights, the revival of Native 
Đultuƌes aŶd ƌeligioŶs, a ƌeŶeǁal of pƌide iŶ Natiǀe ideŶtitǇ, aŶd ͞uŶitǇ aŵoŶg ouƌ people͟ 
(Fed Up!, 1970b: 6). As such, Hey-Tra-Sneyo was more than just a group of dissenting GIs – it 
also stood for Red Power, and its leaders appear to have viewed their advocacy of Native GI 
resistance within the context of the wider Red Power movement.  
 
The manifesto referred to the US military as enforcers of white supremacy, 
ƌepƌeseŶtatiǀes of ͞the INVADE‘“͟, fƌoŵ ǁhoŵ Natiǀes should ďe pƌoteĐted, Ŷot dƌafted to 
serve (Fed Up!, 1970b: 6). Hey-Tra-“ŶeǇo͛s oǀeƌaƌĐhiŶg oďjeĐtiǀe ǁas to applǇ aŶ 
understanding of the histories, cultures, and treaty rights of all tribes to their work in 
providing Native GIs who were unwilling to serve, and/or being subjected to repression, 
                                                          
1 Originally named Hey-Kecaw-Na-Yo. 
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with protection and legal assistance (Fed Up!, 1970b: 6). Ultimately, they also hoped to 
make all Natives exempt from the draft (Fed Up!, 1970ď: ϲͿ. ͞IŶdiaŶ seƌǀiĐeŵeŶ aƌe a sŵall 
paƌt of the Aƌŵed “eƌǀiĐes,͟ the ŵaŶifesto aĐkŶoǁledged, ͞ďut ǁe aƌe … staŶdiŶg foƌ ouƌ 
people aŶd staŶdiŶg foƌ ouƌ ƌights͟ ;Fed Up!, 1970b: 6).  
 
Convinced that the military had brainwashed Natives into serving their own 
oppressors, Hey-Tra-“ŶeǇo felt theǇ had ďeeŶ ͞Đalled upoŶ ďǇ ouƌ aŶĐestƌal ͚Waƌƌioƌ͛ 
predecessors to ƌise aŶd ŵake ouƌ ǀoiĐes heaƌd͟ – a subversive interpretation of Native 
traditions of warriorhood that was very different to that of less radical Natives like the 
aforementioned Alvina Alberts (quoted in Gershen, 1968: 14), but directly in line with that 
of the Red Power movement (Fed Up!, 1970b: 6). What is more, they endorsed a militant 
appƌoaĐh. ͞IŶdiaŶ people aƌe tiƌed of ďeggiŶg foƌ ǁhat ďeloŶgs to theŵ͟, the ŵaŶifesto 
asseƌted, ͞IŶdiaŶ Ǉouth aƌe … Ŷo loŶgeƌ ďeggiŶg; ǁe deŵaŶd oƌ take!͟ ;Fed Up!, 1970b: 6).  
 
This line of thinking had already been put into practice in March 1970, when Hey-
Tra-Sneyo lent its support to a series of protests at another nearby military installation. Red 
Power activists from the Seattle-based United Indians of All Tribes (UIAT) were attempting 
to reclaim soon-to-be surplus land at Fort Lawton, WA, on which they hoped to build a 
cultural and educational center (Whitebear, 1994). The government planned to transfer the 
land to city authorities, causing UIAT, who believed the land to be theirs by treaty right, to 
stage several occupations of the facility in protest (Whitebear, 1994). On March 14, Hey-Tra-
Sneyo launched a subsidiary demonstration at Fort Lewis (Fed Up!, 1970b: 4).  
 
We kŶoǁ ŶothiŶg of the oƌgaŶisatioŶ͛s leadeƌship stƌuĐtuƌe, ďut at Foƌt Leǁis, they 
appear to have been represented primarily by Deni Leonard (Whitebear, 1994: 5). In the 
weeks following its foundation and leading up to the Fort Lewis protest, Hey-Tra-Sneyo had 
forged connections with leading figures in other spheres of the radical community. Leonard 
had visited Alcatraz Island, CA, then under occupation by Red Power protestors, a 
contingent of whom would then come to help at Forts Lewis and Lawton (The Bond, 1970d: 
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1). One contemporary news report about the actress and anti-war spokeswoman Jane 
Fonda͛s iŶǀolǀeŵeŶt ǁith the pƌotest tells of her meetings with representatives of local 
Natiǀe fishiŶg ƌights, laŶd ƌights, aŶd pƌisoŶ ƌights oƌgaŶisatioŶs, aloŶgside ͞ƌed-bereted 
ŵeŵďeƌs of aŶ IŶdiaŶ GI ƌesistaŶĐe gƌoup͟ – undoubtedly Hey-Tra-Sneyo (Dunphy, 1970: 
A20).  
 
Accordingly, Hey-Tra-“ŶeǇo͛s ageŶda at Foƌt Leǁis ǁas tǁofold. As sigŶified ďǇ theiƌ 
red berets, they hoped to show solidarity with UIAT, and to draw police attention away from 
Fort Lawton, where activists, including Sid Mills, who was still an active GI at this time, had 
allegedly been physically assaulted by the authorities (Johansen, 2013: 141 + 192; Fed Up!, 
1970b: 4 + 9). In addition to this Red Power agenda, Hey-Tra-“ŶeǇo ǁas, at its Đoƌe, a GI͛s 
organisation, and was supported at Fort Lewis by non-Native GIs and civilian peace activists 
– including Fonda – in making a stand against the war, the draft, and the treatment of 
Native servicemen (The Bulletin, 1970: 1; Fed Up!, 1970b: 4 + 9).  
 
Hey-Tra-Sneyo picketers carried signs that connected the Indians Wars with 
Vietnam, essentially articulating stƌuĐtuƌes of ƌeĐogŶitioŶ, iŶĐludiŶg ͞No VietŶaŵese eǀeƌ 
ŵuƌdeƌed ŵǇ People oƌ “tole MǇ LaŶd͟, aŶd ͞Custeƌ Had It CoŵiŶg, “o Does GeŶ. PeaƌsoŶ͟ 
(Fed Up!, 1970b: 4). They proclaimed their support for UIAT, and handed out leaflets to the 
public about the hardships faced by Native communities (Fed Up!, 1970b: 4). After five 
hours, during which time they managed to disrupt activities at the base, and attract the 
attention of the authorities and the media, Hey-Tra-Sneyo joined UIAT at Fort Lawton – 
ǁheƌe the oĐĐupieƌs͛ Đlaiŵs ǁeƌe eǀeŶtuallǇ ƌeĐogŶised, ƌesultiŶg iŶ the fouŶdatioŶ of the 
Daybreak Star Cultural Center, still in operation to this day (Fed Up!, 1970b: 4; Whitebear, 
1994: 5).  
 
Thus, Hey-Tra-“ŶeǇo͛s ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶ to the Fort Lewis, and, to a lesser extent, Fort 
Lawton protests, just like the organisation itself, must be seen as a synchronisation of Red 
Power and GI resistance agendas – and an effective one, at that. Due to their focus on treaty 
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rights, Native advocates of GI resistance were by default also advocates of Red Power, and 
at Forts Lewis and Lawton Hey-Tra-Sneyo ǁas aŶ iŶtegƌal ŵeŵďeƌ of a ͞ĐoalitioŶ͟ of Natiǀe 
treaty and civil rights groups from throughout the US and Canada (Whitebear, 1994: 5). As 
such, Hey-Tra-Sneyo might reasonably be described as a serviĐeŵeŶ͛s ǁiŶg of ‘ed Poǁeƌ – 
an idea that has not surfaced elsewhere, perhaps because we know so little about the 
organisation, and even less about Native GI resistance more generally, let alone how it 
might have fed into Red Power.  
  
Historians have noted the existence of Hey-Tra-Sneyo, but thus far have been unable 
to analyse its activities in any detail, probably because relevant source material is so elusive 
(Cortright, 2005: 77 + 329; Kindig, 2008; Rosier, 2009: 243). The organisation put out a 
publication called Yah-Hoh, about which we know nothing other than the fact it was 
͞puďlished ďƌieflǇ duƌiŶg the suŵŵeƌ of ϭϵϳϬ͟ – no copies appear to have been archived or 
otherwise made available (RITA Notes, ϭϵϳϰ: ϲͿ. The distƌiďutioŶ of a ͞Ŷeǁsletteƌ … [to] 
ďases, ƌeseƌǀatioŶs aŶd oƌgaŶizatioŶs͟ appeaƌs oŶ a list of objectives in the Fed Up! (1970: 
6) manifesto, so Yah-Hoh was clearly intended for a wide readership. As GI movement 
historian and former participant David Cortright (2005: 239-240) tells us, newspapers and 
newsletters were ͞the ďest ŵeaŶs aǀailaďle for communicating with other GIs.͟ However, 
short-lived as it was, Yah-Hoh was likely never circulated as widely as its producers 
intended, if at all outside of the Seattle/Tacoma area.  
 
The number of Native servicemen who came to the organisation for help is also 
unknown, and we have no idea how effective it might have been in this respect. As we have 
seen, the reliance on treaty rights had failed in the past, and Hey-Tra-Sneyo would need a 
fresh approach if they were to be more successful at keeping Native GIs out of Southeast 
Asia. At any rate, as was typical of Vietnam-era GI groups, the organisation does not appear 
to have been active for very long. After the spring of 1970, aside from a couple of outdated 
references, Hey-Tra-Sneyo ceased to exist as far as the press was concerned (e.g. Liberation 
News Service, 1970: 7; RITA Notes, 1974: 6; UŶited “tates “eƌǀiĐeŵeŶ͛s FuŶd, ϭϵϳϭ: ϴͿ. DeŶi 
Leonard continued his work with both the Red Power and GI resistance movements for 
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some time after the Lawton-Lewis protests, even after his subversive activities earned him 
aŶ ͚uŶfit͛ disĐhaƌge from the Army in mid-1970, but none of the stories about him, nor any 
of his own writings, ever mentioned Hey-Tra-Sneyo again (The Bond, 1970c: 4; GI Alliance, 
1970: 1).  
 
If Hey-Tra-Sneyo itself was short-lived, its legacy may not have been. Janet McCloud, 
a leading fishing rights activist and early associate of Hey-Tra-Sneyo, became deeply 
involved with Native GI resistance in the Pacific Northwest, and continued to be so long 
after Hey-Tra-“ŶeǇo had faded iŶto oďsĐuƌitǇ. ͞[Natiǀe GIs] aƌe goiŶg to jail͟, she oŶĐe 
deĐlaƌed, ͞ƌatheƌ thaŶ help KiŶg CoŶg fight the Viet CoŶg͟ ;MĐCloud, Ƌuoted iŶ ‘osieƌ, 
2009: 243). Throughout the early 1970s, McCloud hosted a radio show where she discussed 
the issues surrounding Native military service – which came highly recommended by Deni 
Leonard (1970a: 8) – on Seattle-based KRAB FM, and ran an operation out of the Native 
American Free University (NAFU) in Yelm, WA that functioned in much the same capacity as 
Hey-Tra-Sneyo, providing advice and assistance to Native GIs. With a view to spreading 
awareness, McCloud (quoted in KRAB Program Guide, 1973) and her associates at NAFU also 
pƌoduĐed a ďooklet foƌ ǁideƌ ĐiƌĐulatioŶ eŶtitled ͚WiŶŶiŶg the PeaĐe͛, a ĐolleĐtioŶ of ͞all 
eduĐatioŶal ŵateƌials ǁe haǀe ďeeŶ aďle to gatheƌ ĐoŶĐeƌŶiŶg Natiǀe people aŶd the dƌaft.͟ 
 
Like Hey-Tra-Sneyo, McCloud (quoted in KRAB Program Guide, 1973) and co. 
believed that Natives should be exempt from conscription, and in February 1973, they 
issued aŶ ͞“.O.“. ŵessage to all people of peaĐe͟, askiŶg foƌ suppoƌt fƌoŵ KRAB listeners 
with the ongoing legal defence of a relative of hers, Umatilla draftee Michael McCloud – 
better known as Sumac (Amex->Canada, 1973: 19). Drafted in early 1970, Sumac quickly 
developed a disdain for the violence and racism of Army life, and in April 1970 he went 
AWOL from Fort Lewis (Amex->Canada, 1973: 19; Spokane Daily Chronicle, 1974: 28). By the 
time authorities caught up with him in August 1972, he had been absent for more than two 
years (Spokane Daily Chronicle, 1974: 28). Awaiting AWOL charges at Fort Ord, CA, Sumac 
wrote an open letter to his commanding officer (Amex->Canada, 1973: 19; Great Speckled 
Bird, 1972: 15).  
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In his statement, Sumac, who had a close family connection to the fishing rights 
movement and appears to have been an advocate of Red Power prior to being drafted, once 
again invoked the treaty argument (Adams, 2011a: 64-65; Amex->Canada, ϭϵϳϯ: ϭϴͿ. ͞I aŵ 
… a Ŷatuƌal ďoƌŶ ĐitizeŶ of the Uŵatilla … NatioŶs͟, “uŵaĐ ;Ƌuoted iŶ Amex->Canada, 1973: 
ϭϴͿ deĐlaƌed, ͞[ǁho] haǀe aŶ eǆistiŶg … tƌeatǇ ǁith the [U“, aŶd] to ŵǇ kŶoǁledge haǀe Ŷot 
deĐlaƌed ǁaƌ upoŶ aŶǇ ŶatioŶ͟: 
I wish to remaiŶ loǇal to ŵǇ people … aŶd to ƌeŵaiŶ at … peaĐe ǁith all … ŶatioŶs. 
My conscience will not allow me to be used as an instrument to destroy other 
people or property because it is against the things I have been taught by my family, 
… tƌiďal eldeƌs, aŶd … spiritual leaders. 
 
His words echoed those of his allies at NAFU, who had clearly helped him compose 
the statement (Amex->Canada, 1973: 18-19). Former draft-resister Hank Adams (2011a: 64-
ϲϱͿ, a Đlose assoĐiate of JaŶet MĐCloud aŶd otheƌ ŵeŵďeƌs of “uŵaĐ͛s family, including his 
grandfather, leading fishing rights advocate Willie Frank, Sr., also lent his support to the 
Đase. ͞It is Ŷot fittiŶg that ϵϯ-year-old Willie Frank should be compelled repeatedly to 
appear in State and Federal courts to protect his rights aŶd pƌopeƌties͟, Adaŵs (2011a: 64-
65) declared, ͞Ǉet fiŶd his gƌaŶdĐhildƌeŶ dƌagged off ďǇ the [U“] to seƌǀe iŶ its ŵilitaƌǇ, oƌ 
[else] ďe faĐed ǁith leŶgthǇ seŶteŶĐes iŶ ŵilitaƌǇ stoĐkades͟. The AƌŵǇ offeƌed “uŵaĐ a 
way out – aŶ ͚uŶdesiƌaďle͛ disĐhaƌge – but he insisted upon defending his side of the larger 
dispute over Natives and draft-exemption at court-martial (Amex->Canada, 1973: 18-19; Fed 
Up!, 1973a: 9).  
 
DuƌiŶg the suďseƋueŶt pƌoĐeediŶgs, “uŵaĐ͛s legal ĐouŶsel adopted a Ŷeǁ appƌoaĐh 
to an old argument, through which they hoped to settle the dispute between Natives and 
the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt oǀeƌ ĐoŶsĐƌiptioŶ ͞oŶĐe aŶd foƌ all͟ ;Amex->Canada, 1973: 19). As we have 
seen, the snag of previous attempts to invoke treaty rights in draft-resistance cases was the 
fact that, by virtue first of the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, and then a string of 
confirmatory acts over the following decades, all Natives were officially considered US 
  45 
citizens, and thus eligible for the draft (Spokane Daily Chronicle, 1974: 28Ϳ. “uŵaĐ͛s legal 
team, however, argued that existing legislation regarding Native citizenship was 
unconstitutional, and that Natives who considered themselves citizens of their own tribes, 
like Sumac, should not be compelled to submit to US citizenship if they chose to reject it 
(Spokane Daily Chronicle, 1974: 28). Inevitably, the outcome was not in their favour, and 
Sumac was dishonourably discharged (Spokane Daily Chronicle, 1974: 28).  
 
We do not know if Janet McCloud and her colleagues at NAFU ever organised Native 
GIs to take part in protests, but their work, though perhaps more intellectual, and less 
militant, than that of Hey-Tra-Sneyo, had a similarly hybridised political agenda – equal parts 
Red Power and GI resistance. Thus, McCloud͛s ǁoƌk ŵaǇ haǀe iŶ paƌt ƌepƌeseŶted aŶ effoƌt 
to take up the mantle of Hey-Tra-Sneyo, which, as we have seen, had disappeared from 
view, and most likely disbanded, by the end of 1970, if not earlier. Evidence of similar 
organisations elsewhere in the US, outside of the Pacific Northwest, is not forthcoming. This 
begs the question – why might the Pacific Northwest have been the only region in which a 
coordinated Native GI resistance movement took root during the Vietnam War?  
 
Firstly, the Pacific Northwest has a fairly large Native population, and during the 
Vietnam era there was a well-established support base for Red Power among the various 
tribes in the region, many of which were at that time united in their pursuit of a common 
goal – fishing rights. Secondly, by the early 1970s, there was an equally well-established GI 
movement in the region, centered around Fort Lewis, which appears to have housed a 
substantial population of Native GIs who were members of local tribes. While there were 
other regions with higher Native populations, other regions with thriving Red Power 
movements, and other regional centres of GI resistance, in the Pacific Northwest all three of 
these factors appear to have come into play at just the right time. Hence, perhaps, the 
success of Native GI organisers like Sid Mills and Deni Leonard, the emergence of Hey-Tra-
Sneyo at Fort Lewis, and the work of Janet McCloud and co. at KRAB and NAFU.  
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As American military involvement in the war wound down throughout 1970-1973, 
the government moved towards creating an all-volunteer military, and with it an end to 
conscription, and thus the wider GI resistance movement lost momentum as the war, and 
the draft, drew to a close (Cortright, 2005: 85 + 238 + 271-272). While legal cases involving 
individual Native draft-resisters continued throughout the later years of the war and 
beyond, any large-scale, pan-tribal, coordinated campaign of resistance to military authority 
by Native GIs – which, as we have seen, likely never existed outside of the Pacific Northwest 
– seems to have dissipated, despite the efforts of McCloud and co., after the dramatic 
events of 1969-1970.  
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(3) Veterans  
 
As we have seen, those Natives who got involved with GI resistance while serving – 
or avoiding service – in the US also became, as a matter of course, Red Power activists. In 
entering the Red Power movement, they were joined by recently discharged Native 
veterans, whose own experiences of military service, though often drastically different to 
those of domestic GIs – especially in the cases of those who had seen combat in Southeast 
Asia – had led to similar changes in the way they thought about Native identity, history, and 
politics. Moreover, these processes of ideological change did not end when they left the 
service, and continued as they attempted to make the difficult readjustment from military 
to civilian life.  
 
Across much of Indian Country, veterans were treated with respect when they 
returned from service, regardless of how they or their communities felt about the war 
(Bruner, 1988b: 159; Smith, quoted in Murg, 2011b; Swinney, quoted in Chickasaw Nation, 
2014). In mainstream society, however, particularly towards the end of the 1960s and into 
the 1970s, increasingly widespread opposition to the war was often misdirected towards 
returning veterans. As Anishinaabe ex-Marine Jim Northrup (1997: 205) puts it, he and his 
peeƌs ǁeƌe ͞the ǀisiďle sǇŵďol of the failuƌe of AŵeƌiĐa͛s poliĐies͟.  
 
Many Native veterans who served overseas recall meeting with a cold reception, and 
sometimes active hostility and abuse, especially from anti-war protestors, when they arrived 
back in the States – experiences that they often resented (e.g. Cano, quoted in Armitage, 
2014; Combs, quoted in Murg, 2011a; Flyinghorse, 2016; Morningstorm, 2004: 12-14; Murg, 
ϮϬϭϭĐ; TeCuďe, ϮϬϬϬ: Ϯϱϵ; Walkaďout, Ƌuoted iŶ Bedaƌd, ϭϵϵϴ: ϲϯ; Walkeƌ, ϮϬϭϯͿ. ͞We 
[had] fought a ǁhite ŵaŶ͛s ǁaƌ,͟ oŶe Natiǀe veteran said, ͞aŶd the fiƌst thiŶg that happeŶs 
wheŶ I get ďaĐk is that soŵe ǁhite kid … spits oŶ ŵe͟ ;Holŵ, ϭϵϴϵ: 65).  
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For many Native veterans, such experiences can only have added to the effects of 
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). While PTSD is a universal problem among veterans, 
studies have found that the onset and severity of the disorder depends to a significant 
extent on the nature of their service, which during the Vietnam era could in turn depend on 
race. Intra-military racism has been causally linked to higher rates of PTSD among minority 
veterans, as has combat experience (Beals, 2002; Loo et al, 2001; Scurfield, 2006: 83-84).  
 
Native GIs, being subject to ISS, were disproportionately involved in combat, leading 
to noticeably high rates of PTSD among Native veterans after their return from the war 
(Holm, 1996: 9). The disorder, characterised by flashbacks, insomnia, social alienation, and 
depression, among other debilitating symptoms, had not yet been properly recognised 
during the Vietnam era, and several of our sources highlight the lack of support available to 
them when they returned home (e.g. Barse, 2016; Holm, 1989: 65; Mitchell, 2004: 79-80; 
Murg, 2011d; Wood, 2011: 106).  
 
Those veterans who came from reservation communities often received a warmer 
welcome than those who had to make their way in the non-Native world, but, because of 
the controversy surrounding their service, the nature of their return from the war, much like 
the nature of the war itself, could be troubling for those with traditional sensibilities. ͞TheǇ 
ƌetuƌŶed sepaƌatelǇ, usuallǇ at Ŷight,͟ Holm (1996: 169-171) tells us, ͞slipping silently back 
home, just as their warrior ancestors had done only in defeat.͟ Moreover, on most 
reservations, socio-economic conditions were dire – indeed, many had enlisted in an 
attempt to escape such problems, and now returned to find that things had, in many cases, 
gotten even worse while they had been away (Johnson, 1996: 32).  
 
“tƌuggliŶg to fiŶd ǁoƌk as ͞aŶ IŶdiaŶ iŶ a ǁhite-ƌuŶ toǁŶ͟, Daƌƌell Neǁ PleŶtǇ “taƌs 
(& Evans, 2008: 27-28) returned to the Pine Ridge Reservation, SD, which was in a bad way. 
͞I ďeĐaŵe aǁaƌe foƌ the fiƌst tiŵe just hoǁ tƌapped ŵǇ people ǁeƌe͟, he ǁƌites, ͞poǀeƌtǇ, 
siĐkŶess, alĐohol, … dƌugs … [aŶd] hopelessŶess. Theƌe ǁeƌe tiŵes ǁheŶ it felt as though I 
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ǁas … ǁatĐhiŶg soŵe Đƌuel plaǇ uŶfold – a plaǇ I kŶeǁ ǁould haǀe Ŷo happǇ eŶdiŶg͟ ;Neǁ 
Plenty Stars & Evans, 2008: 28-29). In the face of such despair, he, like many others, turned 
to drink (New Plenty Stars & Evans, 2008: 29-43).  
 
LaDue (1983: 5) quotes a Native veteran from the Pacific Northwest, who, like the 
aforementioned Sid Mills, returned from Vietnam only to find himself in another ͞ǁaƌ 
zoŶe͟, iŶ ǁhiĐh his people were fighting and dying in the dispute over fishiŶg ƌights. ͞I am a 
tƌeatǇ fisheƌŵaŶ, aŶ AŵeƌiĐaŶ IŶdiaŶ aŶd a VietŶaŵ Đoŵďat ǀeteƌaŶ͟, LaDue͛s ;ϭϵϴϯ: ϱͿ 
ǀeteƌaŶ stated, ͞I͛ǀe got thƌee stƌikes agaiŶst ŵe͟: 
I saw things in Vietnam I can't forget, people dying because of me. Then I came 
home to the reservation and I see my people die and I can't stop it. It's like a war 
zone all over again. Sometimes I feel like my whole life has been a war.  
 
While on some reservations, veterans, with their leadership expertise and greater 
experience of the outside world, were naturally seen as potential leaders and spokespeople, 
they still needed to find work, and, thus, many left their reservation communities, availing 
themselves of the incentives made available to them by the Relocation Act, and moved to 
urban areas (Johnson, 1996: 32; Loew, quoted in Fischer, 2007: 41). However, they often 
fouŶd little iŶ the ǁaǇ of iŶfƌastƌuĐtuƌe to help theŵ adjust to the ŵoƌe ͞Đutthƌoat͟ Ŷatuƌe 
of urban life (Anderson et al, 1974: 61).  
 
Racism barred their access to stable employment, and they were further 
disadvantaged by their association with an increasingly unpopular war, as well as the 
psychological issues and social stigma concomitant with PTSD – as Larry Mitchell (2004: 59-
60 + 68-69 + 81) puts it, outside of their own communities, Native veterans like himself were 
effectively ͞ďlaĐklisted͟ (Cano, quoted in Armitage, 2014; Hernandez, 2016; Johnson, 1996: 
32). Moreover, for those who had expressed radical ideas and displayed subversive 
tendencies during service, or who had simply fallen foul of increasingly strict military laws, 
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finding employment and gaining access to ǀeteƌaŶs͛ ďeŶefits would be even more difficult 
(Cortright, 2005: 232-233; Wetherholt, 2013). 
 
In short, Natiǀe ǀeteƌaŶs faĐed aŶ uphill stƌuggle. ͞All dooƌs Ŷoƌŵally opeŶed͟, oŶe 
observer declared in strong terms, ͞haǀe ďeeŶ slaŵŵed shut iŶ theiƌ faĐes. The oŶlǇ dooƌs 
the Indian veteran finds open are racial discrimination, unemployment, slum housing, 
ďƌokeŶ faŵilies, suiĐide, alĐohol aŶd skid ƌoǁ͟ ;Petite, Ƌuoted iŶ “mith & Warrior, 1996: 
292-293). Faced with such dire circumstances, Native veterans naturally sought for a way to 
improve things, and for some this would lead them into radical territory.  
 
Many turned to university education, often taking advantage of the financial 
assistance made available to them under the remit of the GI Bill (Johnson, 1996: 32; Rios, 
2008: 45). University campuses were centres of radical political activity during the Vietnam 
era, and some of those veterans who had begun to develop radical opinions during their 
time in service would find much to fuel the growth of such ideas (Holm, 1989: 59; Johansen, 
2010: 251). Woody Kipp (2004: 85-89), for instance, first began to make sense of his 
experiences of racism and the structures of recognition he had formed during service while 
attending the University of Montana as a GI Bill student in the early 1970s – his liberal 
professors even allowed him to defer his studies to become involved with Red Power 
activism, due to the ŵoǀeŵeŶt͛s poteŶtial eduĐatioŶal ǀalue. 
 
In some cases, Native veterans responded to the issues they and their communities 
were facing by attempting to return to the traditional ways of their elders, and thus joined 
the wider revival of Native customs that was taking place across the US at that time (Carroll, 
2008: 147-148 + 162; Holm, 1984; DeGroot, 1986). Those affected by PTSD, for instance, 
often found little in the mainstream world to help them deal with their trauma, and turned 
to the elders and medicine men of their tribes, through whom they were sometimes able to 
find respite in traditional customs concerning the spiritual healing of veterans (Barse, 1994; 
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Holm, 1989: 66; Scurfield, 1995; Smith, quoted in Murg, 2011b; Walkabout, quoted in 
Johnson, 1986: 4B).  
 
As a direct reaction to his experiences in Vietnam and his post-service PTSD, Z.G. 
Standing Bear (1996: 82-85) sought to reconnect with his cultural roots. He became 
interested in Red Power, and describes hearing a speech by Red Power leader Russell Means 
as a turning point in his life, ǁhiĐh ŵotiǀated hiŵ to eŵďaƌk upoŶ ǁhat he Đalls a ͞MediĐiŶe 
Path͟, studying and becoming involved in the revival of a variety of Native religious 
traditions, many of which had been and continued to be repressed by the US government 
(Standing Bear, 1996: 84-86).  
 
Oglala ex-pilot Ed McGaa (2014: 214) felt particularly bitter about the fact that 
Native cultures, religious Đustoŵs iŶ paƌtiĐulaƌ, had ďeeŶ ƌepƌessed ǁhile, ͞[i]Ŷ the 
ŵeaŶtiŵe, ǁe faithfullǇ seƌǀed ouƌ ĐouŶtƌǇ͟. Pƌioƌ to leaǀiŶg foƌ seƌǀiĐe iŶ ďoth Koƌea aŶd 
Vietnam, he took part in ceremonies designed to ensure his safe return (McGaa, 2014: 216 + 
237-238). When he came back in one piece, he attributed his good fortune to these 
ceremonies, and, despite his self-aǀoǁedlǇ haǁkish staŶĐe oŶ the ǁaƌ, deĐided to ͞leaǀe 
the ǁaƌƌiŶg to politiĐiaŶs͟, aŶd to ͞set his Đouƌse upoŶ aŶotheƌ path͟ ;MĐGaa, ϮϬϭϰ: ϭϲϲ + 
174-177). He subsequently became deeply involved with the more spiritual side of the Red 
Power movement, working alongside some of the leading movement figures of the early 
1970s (McGaa, 2014: 166 + 232-241; Means, 1995: 188-189 + 304).  
 
Consumed by bitterness over the discrimination he felt he had experienced in the 
military, and struggling with unemployment and alcoholism post-service, Darrell New Plenty 
Stars (& Evans, 2008: 29-ϯϬ + ϰϰͿ saǁ his pƌoďleŵs as the ƌesult of ƌaĐisŵ, of ďeiŶg ͞uŶdeƌ 
the ǁhite ŵaŶ͛s thuŵď͟, aŶd Đaŵe to feel that ͞aĐtiŶg like ǁhite people͟, aŶd tƌǇiŶg to 
engage with the white capitalist mainstream, would not bode well for Native culture. When 
a dispute arose in his community between those who wanted to maintain tradition and 
those who, in his opinion, were willing to reject their culture and exploit their reservation 
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for the sake of profit, New Plenty Stars (& Evans, 2008: 30-43) chose the side of the 
traditionalists, and, ultimately, Red Power. 
 
In late 1969, Seminole ex-Marine Alan Miller was among a group of Red Power 
activists called the Indians of All Tribes (IAT) who occupied Alcatraz Island in San Francisco 
Bay, CA, in hopes of reclaiming the land for Native people (Fortunate Eagle & Findley, 2002: 
170-171). After relocating to San Francisco from his Oklahoma reservation, Miller had found 
that whatever advantages his military service might initially have granted him in terms of 
adjusting to urban life ǁeƌe of little use oŶĐe he ǁas ͞Đut loose͟ iŶ the ĐitǇ (Miller, quoted in 
Fortunate Eagle & Findley, 2002: 58).  
 
Finding sanctuary in his local Indian Center, he came into contact with advocates of 
Red Power, became an early proponent of the foundation of Native American Studies 
courses at San Francisco State University, and got involved with the group of activists that 
would eventually occupy Alcatraz (Fortunate Eagle & Findley, 2002: 58; Kenmitzer, 1997: 
115). Adam Fortunate Eagle, one of the masterminds behind the occupation, may have had 
Miller in mind when he stated that recently relocated veterans were among those who had 
a radical political influence on him when he arrived in San Francisco in the late 1960s 
(Contrary Warrior, 2010).  
 
Throughout the occupation, which lasted from November 1969 to June 1971, a 
number of veterans joined Miller at Alcatraz. Santee Navy veteran John Trudell, who had 
only recently returned from his second and final tour of duty in Vietnamese waters, joined 
the occupiers in hopes of reconnecting with his Native roots, and quickly became a leading 
spokesperson (Johansen, 2013: 255). Another recent returnee, Shoshone-Paiute veteran 
Thomas Joseph, Sr., mustered a group of fellow UCLA students to go to the island with him 
and take part (Lost Coast Outpost, 2015). Some of the veterans involved in the occupation 
drew direct, causal connections between their activism and their experiences of service. 
Pomo-Wailaki veteran J.R. Laiwa and the aforementioned Bill Means, both combat veterans, 
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had been profoundly influenced by the structures of recognition they had formed in 
Vietnam, and were drawn to activism as a result (Norrell, 2013; Rahimi, 2009).  
 
The roles and motivations of the most substantial group of veterans to take part in 
the occupation are, unfortunately for historians, shrouded in controversy. When the 
oĐĐupieƌs͛ de facto leader Richard Oakes left the island in early 1970, a leadership crisis 
eŶsued, aŶd “tella LeaĐh, ǁho ƌaŶ the oĐĐupieƌs͛ health ĐliŶiĐ, assuŵed a leadiŶg positioŶ iŶ 
IAT. Her rise to prominence has been connected to a gƌoup Đalled the ͚ThuŶdeƌďiƌds͛ – a 
band of Native youths from her hometown of nearby Oakland, CA (Johnson, 1996: 157). The 
ƌegƌettaďlǇ sĐaŶt ďodǇ of eǀideŶĐe ƌelatiŶg to the ͚ThuŶdeƌďiƌds͛ iŶdiĐates that a number of 
them were Vietnam veterans. Commentators, however, are divided in their interpretations 
of the group.  
 
They have been described by some as an all-Natiǀe ͞stƌeet gaŶg͟, ĐoŶsistiŶg of 
͞ďikeƌs, VietŶaŵ ǀets, aŶd stƌeet toughs͟, aŵoŶg ǁhom were Stella LeaĐh͛s oǁŶ soŶs, ǁho, 
in return for her patronage, reportedly donned Army fatigues and acted as her armed 
enforcers and security guards, violently intimidating those who did not agree with her, and 
exploiting their position to make money from boot-legging and drug-trafficking while on the 
island (e.g. Dewing, 1995: 27; Fortunate Eagle & Findley, 2002: 158 + 169-170; Goldstein, 
2011: 97-98; Johansen, 2013: 18; Smith & Warrior, 1996: 66).  
 
In conflicting accounts, they have been depicted as a more benign presence – a 
͞soĐial gƌoup͟ ;e.g. Johansen, 2013: 18; Johnson, 1996: 158). Leading occupier LaNada 
Boyer claimed that her brother Dwayne, who was the leader of the group, had brought the 
͚ThuŶdeƌďiƌds͛ to the island at the behest of his family, who had asked him to protect his 
sisters (Johnson, 1996: 158 + 206). While on the island, she claimed, the group were in fact a 
positive influence, and were paƌtlǇ ƌespoŶsiďle foƌ keepiŶg the oĐĐupieƌs͛ opeƌatioŶ goiŶg 
during the difficult aftermath of Richard Oakes͛ depaƌtuƌe ;JohŶsoŶ, ϭϵϵϲ: ϭϱϴͿ.  
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If the ͚ThuŶdeƌďiƌds͛ ǁeƌe iŶdeed a gaŶg, theŶ the pƌeseŶĐe of ƌeĐeŶt ƌetuƌŶees 
from Vietnam among their ranks would give us an indication of the sort of groups that 
traumatised, disgruntled Native veterans might gravitate towards if they ended up in the 
wrong place at the wrong time. Other Native veterans have documented their self-
destructive tendencies and PTSD-fuelled involvement with drink, drugs, and criminal 
activity, sometimes violent, in the aftermath of their return from service, and Oakland, 
which was at that time one of the main terminals for GIs both headed for and returning 
from East Asia, was and is known for its problems with gangs (Beeman, 2011; Harris, 2011; 
Johnson, 1986: 4B; New Plenty Stars, 2007: 45).  
 
Alternatively, if we accept a more positive interpretation, veteran membership of a 
gƌoup like the ͚ThuŶdeƌďiƌds͛ ŵight haǀe ƌepƌeseŶted aŶotheƌ foƌŵ of ĐoŶstƌuĐtiǀe 
readjustment to post-service life – a support network. As the true nature of their role in the 
occupation remains unclear, however, to write ǁith aŶǇ authoƌitǇ oŶ the ͚ThuŶdeƌďiƌds͛, 
and what their presence at Alcatraz might tell us about the post-service activities of some 
Native Vietnam-era veterans, would be impossible at this time. While the demands of the 
Alcatraz occupiers were never met, their widely publicised actions made an impression on 
the government, the media, and the public, putting Red Power on the map, and giving fresh 
impetus to the development of the movement. Throughout the early years of the 1970s, 
Native radicals would stage many similarly high-profile protests across North America – 
protests on which Native veterans would begin to have a more visible, and characteristic, 
influence. 
 
In February 1972, an appeal surfaced in the underground press from Richard 
Yeahquo (quoted in Barrage, 1972: 10), a Native veteran who had served in both Korea and 
Vietnam, and had been relatively lucky upon his return home, being giǀeŶ a ǁaƌƌioƌ͛s 
ǁelĐoŵe, ͞ďut theƌe ǁas still soŵethiŶg ŵissiŶg, a feeliŶg … Ǉou Đould Ŷot put iŶto ǁoƌds͟: 
TheŶ Ǉou ƌealized … it ǁas the feeliŶg of aŶ IŶdiaŶ liǀiŶg iŶ a White ŵaŶ[͚s] ǁoƌld, 
ǁith [the] ƌules of the White ŵaŶ ďǇ the WhiteŵaŶ, … foƌ the Whiteman. This is 
Ǉouƌ laŶd aŶd Ǉet Ǉou feel Ǉou doŶ't ďeloŶg … But the tiŵe has Đoŵe foƌ the IŶdiaŶ 
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warrior to stand up again. To walk to the beat of the drum that is put inside every 
IŶdiaŶ ďǇ the Đƌeatoƌ … [G]o to Ǉouƌ Đloset, get that jaĐket [the military] gave to you, 
… put it oŶ aŶd ǁalk ǁith Ǉouƌ people as [aŶ] IŶdiaŶ, as a ‘aĐe, as Bƌotheƌs. 
 
YeahƋuo͛s ;Ƌuoted iŶ Barrage, 1972: 10) appeal to his fellow Native GIs and veterans 
– his ͞Bƌotheƌs͟ – ǁas foƌ ŵoƌe thaŶ just a ƌejeĐtioŶ of the ǁhite ŵaŶ͛s world and a return 
to Native culture, it was for them to make a united declaration of support for Red Power. 
While there does not appear to have been any formal ǀeteƌaŶs͛ Red Power organisation, 
returning Native veterans contributed towards the revival of the next best thing – 
traditional warrior societies (e.g. Bruner, 1988: 159; Holm, 1992: 362-364; Lackenbauer, 
2014: 172-173; Meadows, 1999: 397-398). Of particular importance was a group called the 
American Indian Movement (AIM), founded in 1968. Though its leaders ͞eŵďƌaced the term 
͚ǁaƌƌioƌ soĐietǇ͛͟, AIM, unlike most such organisations, was pan-tribal, and politically 
engaged, ultimately becoming involved in militant Red Power activism (Carroll, 2008: 142-
143 + 151 + 171-172; Holm, 1992: 362-364; Lackenbauer, 2014: 172).  
 
Scholars have noted that Native veterans, moved by feelings of frustration and 
betrayal, joined AIM in high numbers in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Pencak, 2009: 54; 
Schwartz, 2013: 28 + 40 + 186-187). Indeed, as Maureen Schwartz (2013: 186-187) has 
suggested, the influx of activists with military experience into AIM was a central precept of 
its development as a warrior society, and the knowledge and expertise they brought to the 
taďle ͞alloǁed AIM to ďeĐoŵe the ǁaƌƌioƌs theǇ had alǁaǇs ǁaŶted to ďe.͟ Some of these 
veterans assumed leading roles, such as Ponca ex-infantryman Carter Camp, who had 
served in Germany in the late 1950s, and the aforementioned Vietnam veteran John Trudell, 
who was recruited into AIM at Alcatraz (Johansen, 2013: 14). Indeed, one of the 
oƌgaŶisatioŶ͛s Đo-founders, and principle leaders, Ojibwe veteran Dennis Banks (& Erdoes, 
2011: 44-55), had formed structures of recognition while serving on an Air Force base in 
Japan in the mid-1950s that foreshadowed, to a certain extent, those later formed by Native 
GIs in Southeast Asia, and that subsequently informed his work with AIM.  
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In October 1970, a number of AIM leaders spoke at a radical student-sponsored 
sǇŵposiuŵ, held at the UŶiǀeƌsitǇ of OƌegoŶ ;UOͿ, eŶtitled ͚PeƌspeĐtiǀes oŶ ‘aĐisŵ͛, duƌiŶg 
which the ongoing conflict in Southeast Asia was a recurring theme (Eugene-Register Guard, 
1970b: 5B). That discussions would touch upon Vietnam was typical of political forums at 
that time, but, whereas most references to Vietnam by Red Power activists throughout the 
preceding half-decade had concerned US involvement in the war itself, the UO symposium 
gave an early indication that ideas about Native military service and veterancy had also 
begun to have an influence.  
 
AŵoŶg the ͞BƌoǁŶ, BlaĐk aŶd ‘ed͟ luŵiŶaƌies ǁho took to the podiuŵ duƌiŶg the 
five-day conference were a number of veterans, whose presence was particularly noticeable 
in the Native camp (Radical Collectives Union, 1970). Indeed, three out of the half-a-dozen 
or so Natives who spoke on behalf of Red Power that week were ex-servicemen. Speaking 
alongside Dennis Banks and John Trudell, at this time a representative of both AIM and IAT, 
was the aforementioned Ed McGaa, AIM sympathiser/associate and then-Chairman of 
Indian Education at the University of Minnesota (Eugene-Register Guard, 1970a: 7B; Radical 
Collectives Union, 1970).  
 
In relation to the war, and to those serving in it, the various parties in attendance, 
among whose ranks were a number of non-Native returnees from Southeast Asia, are said 
to have pƌeseŶted a uŶited fƌoŶt. ͞All the speakeƌs͟, ǁe aƌe told, ͞suppoƌted the ŵotioŶ … 
that American minorities are being used to wage a ƌaĐist ǁaƌ agaiŶst AsiaŶs͟ ;Eugene-
Register Guard, 1970b: 5B). The guilt and betrayal felt by minority veterans at having fought 
in service of what they now saw as racist oppression and imperialism, while they continued 
to be treated as second-class citizens both in the military and back home in the civilian 
world, was also made abundantly clear (Eugene-Register Guard, 1970b: 5B).  
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Crucially, speakers suggested that the time for peaceful protest may have come and 
gone (Luta, 1970: 6B). Ray Eaglin (quoted in Eugene-Register Guard, 1970b: 5B), a Vietnam 
veteran and Black Panther, made an emphatic statement about the need for action: 
It͛s too late to do aŶǇthiŶg ďut deĐide Ǉouƌ ĐhoiĐe of ǁeapoŶs … If Ǉou thiŶk ǁƌitiŶg 
… ǁill do it, ǁƌite. If Ǉou thiŶk … piĐketiŶg, piĐket. If Ǉou thiŶk pƌaǇiŶg ǁill help, theŶ 
pray. Or if you think arming yourself to the gills will do it – then arm yourself.  
 
In the increasingly volatile American socio-political landscape, many minority 
radicals, Natives included, became frustrated with the more gradual, integrationist 
approach of their forebears, who had hoped to work with the mainstream establishment, 
and adopted an increasingly militant and confrontational approach to activism. Groups like 
the Black Panthers had alƌeadǇ ĐhoseŶ the last of EagliŶ͛s ;Ƌuoted iŶ Eugene-Register Guard, 
1970b: 5B) options, in some instances taking up arms against the authorities – a tactical shift 
that was facilitated in part by the expertise of veterans who joined the organisation during 
and immediately after their periods of military service (Austin, 2010; Westheider, 2006: 340-
344).  
 
At the time of the UO symposium, Red Power activists had not yet gone to such 
extremes. However, through its aggressive and confrontational approach, AIM soon began 
to develop an increasingly antagonistic relationship with the authorities which, perhaps 
inevitably, set the organisation on a course towards violence (McKenzie-Jones, 2015: 93-
100). As we shall see, when armed hostilities eventually broke out, the unique set of skills 
and ideas possessed by those of its members with military experience would become an 
invaluable asset for AIM. For the time being, however, while veterans continued to 
participate in the movement, in some cases assuming leading roles, whatever unique 
significance or influence, as opposed to that of their civilian peers, they might have brought 
to the table remains unclear.  
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In other spheres of radical politics, the unique contributions made by Native 
veterans at this time were more visible. As we have seen, by the turn of the 1970s, the 
Native GI resistance movement in the Pacific Northwest had effectively developed into a 
seƌǀiĐeŵeŶ͛s ǁiŶg of Red Power, and its advocates naturally and necessarily connected Red 
Power ideas and objectives with their radical ideas about military service and the war. 
Meanwhile, Native veterans were taking a similarly hybridised, though less coordinated, 
approach to their work with the anti-war movement.  
 
Though Native ex-servicemen do not appear to have formed any all-Natiǀe ǀeteƌaŶs͛ 
anti-war organisations, they were certainly active in multi-ethnic groups like Vietnam 
Veterans Against the War (VVAW) (Means, 1995: 271). The aforementioned Geary Hobson 
(2016), for instance, was an early proponent of the peace movement in the mid-late 1960s, 
and Bill Means, who returned from service later in the decade, became involved with VVAW 
in the early 1970s, by which time, as we have seen, he was also an active participant in Red 
Power protests (Johansen, 2010: 135; Norrell, 2013).  
 
During the so-Đalled ͚Winter Soldieƌ͛ investigations in Detroit in early 1971, a 
ǀeteƌaŶs͛ aŶti-war summit organised by VVAW, Seminole Navy veteran Evan Haney (quoted 
in Vietnam Veterans Against the War, 1971), the only Native speaker at the event, gave a 
damning testimony against the war, and in doing so drew on the structures of recognition 
he had formed while serving in Southeast Asia. ͞[I]t took ŵe a loŶg tiŵe to ƌealize͟, HaŶeǇ 
(quoted in Vietnam Veterans Against the War, 1971) told the audience, ͞that [what] is 
happening in Vietnam … is not neǁ͟:  
I would like to point out that if Ǉou took the VietŶaŵese ǁaƌ … and compared it to 
the Indian wars a hundred years ago, it would be the same thing. All the massacres 
were the same. Nowadays they use chemical warfare; back then they put smallpox 
in the blankets and gave them to the Indians.  
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Haney (quoted in Vietnam Veterans Against the War, 1971) lamented the fact that, 
until now, he had effeĐtiǀelǇ ďought iŶto his oǁŶ oppƌessioŶ, aŶd had liǀed ďǇ ͞the ǁhite 
ŵaŶ͛s ǁaǇs͟ – ͞IŶdiaŶ, ďut … Ŷot ƌeallǇ … IŶdiaŶ͟. ͞[W]heŶ I ǁatĐhed TV … and watched the 
Indians and the cavalry,͟ he ƌeĐalled, choking back tears of regret as he spoke, ͞I ǁould 
cheer for the cavalry. That's how bad it was͟ (Winter Soldier, 1972). After returning from 
service, Haney (quoted in Vietnam Veterans Against the War, 1971), like many other 
Natives, was now trying to reverse this process of assimilation, to regain something of his 
own culture, and he announced that, in addition to his work with VVAW, he had also 
become involved in Red Power activism, and was at that time living among the occupiers on 
Alcatraz Island. His speech was met with a standing ovation (Winter Soldier, 1972).  
 
In the following months, Haney appears to have continued to be a leading 
spokesperson – and quite possibly the only leading Native spokesperson – for both the 
ǀeteƌaŶs͛ aŶd seƌǀiĐeŵeŶ͛s wings of the anti-war movement. Most notably, when leftist 
radicals from the Venceramos Brigade visited Cuba in March-May 1971 to show their 
solidarity with the Communists in Cuba and elsewhere, Haney was part of a caucus that met 
͞to plaŶ aŶd pƌeseŶt aŶ … eǆplaŶatioŶ of the G.I. ŵoǀeŵeŶt to the CuďaŶo aŶd Vietnamese 
delegatioŶs͟ ;G.I. News & Discussion Bulletin, 1971: 28). After the spring of 1971, however, 
Haney͛s Ŷaŵe ceased to appear in media coverage of the movement, so we know nothing 
of his activities throughout the remainder of the war, and we know even less about those of 
other Native veteran advocates of the peace movement more generally.  
 
Whether or not Haney himself continued to make his presence felt in the peace 
movement, his ideas about the war had a pƌofouŶd iŶflueŶĐe oŶ oŶe of VVAW͛s foremost 
spokespeople. In April 1971, recently returned Navy veteran and future Secretary of State 
John Kerry (1995: 457) testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on behalf of 
VVAW. In articulating his argument against the war, he chose to include in his speech the 
ǁoƌds of ͞[aŶ] AŵeƌiĐaŶ IŶdiaŶ fƌieŶd of ŵiŶe ǁho liǀes iŶ the IŶdiaŶ NatioŶ of AlĐatƌaz͟ – 
almost certainly Evan Haney (Kerry, 1995: 457). Kerry (1995: 457) relayed to the Committee 
HaŶeǇ͛s stoƌǇ aďout ǁatĐhiŶg WesteƌŶs as a ďoǇ and cheering for the cowboys:  
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TheŶ suddeŶlǇ he stopped iŶ VietŶaŵ oŶe daǇ aŶd said, ͚MǇ God, I aŵ doiŶg to 
these people the ǀeƌǇ saŵe thiŶg that ǁas doŶe to ŵǇ people.͛ AŶd that's ǁhat ǁe 
are trying to say, that we think this [war] has to end. 
 
Thus, via Haney, the ideas developed by Native GIs and veterans about Vietnam 
reached the highest levels of the ǀeteƌaŶs͛ anti-war movement at a time when that 
movement was, arguably, at its peak in terms of popular and political support, and, via 
Kerry, were then transmitted to – though ultimately ignored by – leading figures within the 
US government (Cortright, 2005: 259-261; Hunt, 2001: 118-119).  
 
It was not until late in the following year, however, that Native ex-servicemen began 
to make a characteristic impression on the Red Power movement. In October 1972, Red 
Power activists, directed primarily by leaders of AIM, assembled on the west coast, formed a 
protest caravan, the so-called ͚Tƌail of BƌokeŶ Tƌeaties͛ ;TBTͿ, and headed for Washington, 
D.C. with a list of demands concerning the restoration of tribal sovereignty called the 
͚TǁeŶtǇ PoiŶts͛ (Akwesasne Notes, 1974). Veterans were foremost among those who 
embarked on the cross-country trek. Dennis Banks, Carter Camp, John Trudell, Sid Mills – 
names that had become synonymous with Native activism in recent years, and all veterans.  
 
During the early stages of the TBT, Camp (quoted in The Bend Bulletin, 1972: 22) told 
the press that, along with demands for political reform, the protestors would also demand 
that Natiǀe POWs ďe ďƌought hoŵe fƌoŵ VietŶaŵ, aŶd ͞that IŶdiaŶ people Ŷot ďe foƌĐed to 
seƌǀe iŶ the ŵilitaƌǇ͟. AŶotheƌ iŶside souƌĐe would later claim that oŶe of the TBT͛s 
͞pƌiŵaƌǇ puƌposes͟ ǁas to ƌaise loŶg-standing Native issues with the draft and with the mal-
treatment of Native GIs by military authorities (The Conspiracy, 1972: 6). The list of ͚TǁeŶtǇ 
PoiŶts͛ eǀeŶtuallǇ pƌeseŶted to the government in D.C., however, made no mention of 
these issues (Akwesasne Notes, 1974: 63-88).  
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The vague suggestion that Native POWs should be given priority in terms of 
repatriation was not expanded upon by Camp (quoted in The Bend Bulletin, 1972: 22), and 
does not appear elsewhere, indicating that it may have been an under-developed idea. It is, 
perhaps, more surprising that the long-advocated prospect of Native draft-exemption did 
not receive specific mention in the ͚TǁeŶtǇ PoiŶts͛, espeĐiallǇ ĐoŶsideƌiŶg the faĐt that HaŶk 
Adams, whose stance on Natives being forced to undergo mandatory military service has 
been discussed above, was the principle author of the original document (Johansen, 2013: 
5).  
 
However, as draft-exemption was seen by many Natives as an issue of either treaty 
rights, or, in some cases, religion, theŶ the Đoŵpileƌs of the ͚TǁeŶtǇ PoiŶts͛ ŵaǇ ǁell haǀe 
considered the matter covered by points 1 through 8, which concerned the honouring of 
treaty commitments, and point 18, which demanded protection of religious freedoms 
(Adams, 2011b: 185; Akwesasne Notes, 1974: 63-88). Whether or not the issues surrounding 
Native military service remained high on the TBT agenda, the initial intention to press them 
may give an indication of the influence of veterans at the highest levels of the Red Power 
organisations that took part, AIM in particular.  
 
Woody Kipp (2004: 95) was a GI Bill student at the University of Montana when the 
TBT arrived in Missoula. In the summer of 1972, he had attended a powwow, where he first 
met advocates of Red Power (Kipp, 2004: 85-89). Kipp (2004: 87-89) had been taught about 
issues of ƌaĐe aŶd oppƌessioŶ at uŶiǀeƌsitǇ, ďut ďefoƌe the poǁǁoǁ, he ǁƌites, ͞I had Ŷeǀeƌ 
heaƌd IŶdiaŶs disĐuss [theŵ] iŶ detail͟. ͞MǇ VietŶaŵ eǆpeƌieŶĐe͟, he adds, ͞thƌeǁ … these 
ĐoŶĐepts iŶto shaƌp ƌelief͟ ;Kipp, 2004: 85-86). These radical new friends, who were 
members of AIM, had a profound influence on Kipp (2004: 87-89), and he joined their 
organisation. By the time the TBT arrived, Kipp (2004: 85-ϴϲͿ had Đoŵe iŶto ͞a diffeƌeŶt 
sense of who I was as a minoritǇ ŵeŵďeƌ …, soŵethiŶg I had alǁaǇs kŶoǁŶ ďut … Ŷeǀeƌ 
uŶdeƌstood͟. Eager to find a practical application for this new found understanding, he 
joined the TBT on its trek to D.C.  
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When the TBT reached its destination, talks with officials turned sour. The situation 
escalated, and on November 3 about five-hundred activists staged an impromptu 
occupation of the national HQ of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). A court order for their 
departure was issued, deadlines were set, and the occupiers, anticipating a forceful 
response by police, prepared to defend themselves. Robert Burnette (& Koster, 1974: 212), 
one of the leaders of the TBT, witnessed ceremonies held inside the BIA in which those who 
were willing to lead the defence, and to assume the mantle of ͞ǁaƌƌioƌs͟, had their faces 
painted (Banks & Erdoes, 2011: 139).  
 
Woody Kipp (2004: 95-109) was among them – ͞I huŶg out ǁith the ǁaƌƌioƌs͟, he 
recalls. Considering his experience with the Marines in Vietnam to have been something of a 
proving ground, however, he felt no need for a ceremony to confirm his own warrior status 
(Kipp, 2004: 104). He does not mention whether any of his fellow defenders were also 
veterans, but it seems likely that at least some of them were. According to Burnette (& 
Koster, 1974: 212), Vietnam-era veterans were among those who most readily accepted the 
ǁaƌ paiŶt, aŶd ǁith it the pƌoŵise to ͞go doǁŶ sǁiŶgiŶg.͟ Kipp (2004: 102-104) and the 
other defenders armed themselves with whatever they could find, and set about 
constructing makeshift weapons and fortifications (Blair, 1972b: 73).  
 
͞IŶ suďseƋueŶt daǇs͟, Kipp ;ϮϬϬϰ: ϭϬϯͿ tells us, ͞the oĐĐupatioŶ pƌoǀed siŵilaƌ to ŵǇ 
Vietnam experience – long stretches of boredom punctuated by periods of frantic activity as 
deadliŶes foƌ eǀaĐuatioŶ Ŷeaƌed͟. The feaƌed assault Ŷeǀeƌ Đaŵe, hoǁeǀeƌ, paƌtlǇ oǁiŶg to 
the efforts of Hank Adams, who, unlike Kipp and the other veterans inside the BIA, did not 
ready himself for combat. Adams, who advocated a much less aggressive approach to 
activism, was concerned by what the originally peaceful TBT had devolved into, and 
assumed the role of a mediator between the occupiers and the government in hopes of 
avoiding bloodshed (Adams, 2006; Blair, 1972a: 1). After five days, the occupation ended 
without violence, due iŶ Ŷo sŵall paƌt to Adaŵs͛ mediation (Adams, 2006; Deloria, Jr., 1973: 
43).  
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In the months after the TBT, there were further indications that veterans and the 
ideas surrounding Native military service were beginning to have a more tangible influence 
on the movement, AIM especially. Oglala ex-Navy man Bob Yellow Bird Steele and Omaha 
veteran John Two Birds Arbuckle, for instance, were important organisers for AIM in 
Nebraska, most notably during the occupation of the Fort Robinson Museum in late 1972, 
but the way in which their veterancy may have fed into their activism is unclear (Magnuson, 
2008: 222-225; Mason, 1984). In early 1973, AIM activist Ron Petite (Smith & Warrior, 1996: 
292-293), although not a veteran himself, spearheaded a campaign to boycott businesses in 
Rapid City, SD, to raise awareness of what he saw as the neglect of returning Native 
veterans by the government – a situatioŶ that had, iŶ his opiŶioŶ, ƌeaĐhed a poiŶt of ͞Đƌisis͟. 
 
In the spring of 1973, AIM turned its attentions to the Pine Ridge Reservation, SD, 
becoming involved in a dispute between local Oglalas and a newly inaugurated, and 
allegedly corrupt, tribal administration. When AIM attempted to hold a press conference in 
the hamlet of Wounded Knee, the organisation met with a hostile response from the 
authorities, and the situation escalated, ultimately resulting in an impromptu armed 
occupation of Wounded Knee by several hundred militants (Churchill, 2015: 712). The 71-
day occupation – February 27 to May 8, 1973 – known as Wounded Knee II (WKII), 
epitomises the crossover between Native military service and Red Power during the 
Vietnam era.  
 
As a sizable force of federal and tribal authorities, and even military personnel, built 
up around Wounded Knee, it became apparent to the occupiers that they were under siege, 
and that their most pressing need was to defend themselves (Anderson et al, 1974: 2-3; 
Dewing, 1995: 60-61). AIM leader Russell Means (1995: 259) describes how, in the early 
daǇs of the oĐĐupatioŶ, a ŵeetiŶg ǁas held. ͞I asked VietŶaŵ ǀets aŶd aŶǇďodǇ ǁho had 
ŵilitaƌǇ seƌǀiĐe to Đoŵe foƌǁaƌd͟, he ƌeĐalls ;ϭϵϵϱ: ϮϱϵͿ. UŶdeƌ the supeƌǀisioŶ pƌiŵaƌilǇ of 
the aforementioned Stan Holder, by this time a veteran of three tours in Vietnam, those 
ǁho aŶsǁeƌed MeaŶs͛ ;ϭϵϵϱ: ϮϱϵͿ Đall, iŶĐludiŶg his ďƌotheƌ Bill, ǁho had joined AIM back 
at Alcatraz, were made responsible for maintaining security.  
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Such familiar figures as Sid Mills, John Trudell, Bob Yellow Bird Steele, John Two Birds 
Arbuckle, Woody Kipp (2004: 115-136), and Guy Dull Knife, Jr. would all become important 
occupiers, and were joined by a number of other recently returned veteran-activists of the 
Vietnam generation, at least two of whom – the aforementioned Tony Bush, who was from 
Pine Ridge, and Penobscot airman John Moore – were still in active service, and went AWOL 
in order to take part (Buckley, 1974: 21; Magnuson, 2008: 228-230; Schwartz, 2013: 40; 
Wetherholt, 2013). ͞The ǇouŶg ŵeŶ defeŶdiŶg WouŶded KŶee͟, ƌead a ĐoŶteŵpoƌaƌǇ 
report by the Akwesasne Notes ;ϭϵϳϯ: ϱͿ, ͞aƌe ŵilitaƌilǇ skilled aŶd tƌaiŶed͟:  
Almost all are Vietnam veterans, and most of those were in the Special Forces – the 
Green Berets. In Southeast Asia, they learned about guerrilla warfare, courtesy of 
the U.S. government, and now they are using what they learned for their own 
people.  
 
The actual number of Native veterans who took part is unclear – one observer 
estiŵates ͞half a dozeŶ … ŵaǇďe ŵoƌe͟, ǁhile at otheƌ tiŵes theƌe ŵaǇ haǀe ďeeŶ as ŵaŶǇ 
as ͞a feǁ dozeŶ͟ ;Toƌƌes, Ƌuoted iŶ Moseƌ, ϭ996: 118; Zimmerman, 1976: 197). At any rate, 
the pro-Red Power editors of the Akwesasne Notes (1973: 5) were almost certainly 
overstating the presence of veterans among the defenders at WKII – possibly with a view to 
heighteŶiŶg goǀeƌŶŵeŶt appƌeheŶsioŶ aďout the oĐĐupieƌs͛ manpower and defensive 
capabilities.  
 
Russell Means (1995: 259) tells us that the veterans were tasked with training other 
security team members who did not have military expertise. These civilian defenders were 
oƌgaŶised iŶto ͞sƋuads͟, eaĐh of ǁhich was headed by veterans with combat experience 
(Means, 1995: 259). Thus, veterans, rather than making up the bulk of the WKII defence 
force, may in fact have been more like something akin to an officer class, having a certain 
amount of command and responsibility over their less experienced, but more numerous, 
civilian peers. There were originally forty-five defenders in the WKII security team, 
organised into only four squads – another indication that the veterans among them were 
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not nearly as numerous as the Akwesasne Notes might of had us believe (Carroll, 2008: 167). 
Likewise, the claim that most of the veterans at WKII were battle-hardened ex-Special 
Forces members also appears to have been something of an exaggeration – in reality, the 
known service backgrounds of the veterans at WKII varied widely.  
 
Stan Holder was made responsible for the day-to-day activities of the security team, 
and additional military-style training and leadership was provided throughout the 
occupation by Dennis Banks (& Erdoes, 2011: 166) and Caƌteƌ Caŵp, ͞a ǁaƌ leadeƌ … ǁith 
his warƌioƌs͟ ǁho would eventually take over Holder͛s position after he left on April 16 
(Camp-Horinek, quoted in Eaton, 2014; Carroll, 2008: 166-168; Dewing, 1995: 112). Once 
the teaŵ had ďeeŶ oƌgaŶised, the oĐĐupieƌs͛ liŵited supplǇ of guŶs aŶd aŵŵuŶitioŶ ǁas 
distributed, and Holder, according to Means (1995: 259), ͞made sure everyone who got a 
weapon knew how to use it – aŶd ǁould.͟ A defendable perimeter was established around 
the haŵlet, suƌƌouŶdiŶg ǁhiĐh ǁas ͞a soƌt of Ŷo-ŵaŶ͛s laŶd͟, as DeŶŶis BaŶks ;& Erdoes, 
2011: 163) puts it, separating the occupiers and the besieging government forces. This 500-
yard strip was ƌefeƌƌed to as ͞the DM)͟, oƌ deŵilitaƌised zoŶe, ƌeĐalliŶg the laŶguage used 
by military personnel in Vietnam – a trend also evidenced by the way in which the 
oĐĐupieƌs͛ supplǇ ƌoute ǁas dubbed ͞AIM͛s Ho Chi Minh road͟ (Banks & Erdoes, 2011: 163 + 
167; Camp, 2009).  
 
Painfully aware of how exposed their position was at Wounded Knee, those with 
military training quickly set about capitalising upon what little defensive potential the site 
could offer them (Magnuson, 2008: 228). Guarded roadblocks were erected to rival those 
put in place by government forces, sentries began patrolling the perimeter, and makeshift 
fortifications were constructed, modelled on those that the combat veterans among them 
had learned to build while in service (Dewing, 1995: 53-70). Initially limited to digging basic 
foxholes and ditches, the defenders were eventually able to erect bunkers reminiscent of 
those in which some of them had been ensconced back in Vietnam, placed at strategic 
points around the perimeter, and arranged in such a way as to allow the defenders to stay 
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mobile while under fire, and to use overlapping arcs of gunfire against the government 
forces (Camp, 2009; Carroll, 2008: 166-167; Dewing, 1995: 69).  
 
There were ultimately nine such bunkers, each of which was manned by members of 
Holdeƌ͛s security team, who maintained round-the-clock guard duty, and slept, ate, and 
effectively lived in and around their assigned bunkers (Anderson et al, 1974: 76; Carroll, 
2008: 166-167; Dewing, 1995: 69). Continually enlarged and reinforced throughout the 
occupation, these ďuŶkeƌs ǁeƌe eǀeŶtuallǇ augŵeŶted ǁith ͞hoŵelike͟ aĐĐoutƌeŵeŶts 
such as wood-burning stoves (Means, 1995: 277-278). Those stationed in the bunkers, at the 
roadblocks, and out on patrol used citizen-band radios to communicate with security HQ, 
established in a building previously used as the Wounded Knee Museum, from where 
Holder and co., once they got hold of higher grade radio equipment, monitored the 
communications of the government forces (Anderson et al, 1974: 78-79; Means, 1995: 277).  
 
By all accounts, Holder, who was reportedly known for being able to keep a cool 
head under pressure, ran a tight ship (Zimmerman, 1976: 163). According to one observer, 
by early March, the former paratrooper had put together the ͞ďest oƌgaŶized͟ aspeĐt of the 
occupieƌs͛ operation at Wounded Knee – an achievement that appears to have had much to 
do with the military expertise possessed by Holder and the leading members of his team 
(Anderson et al, 1974: 81). As Seminole occupier and ex-Marine Ken Tiger told reporters, the 
veterans at WKII ͞knew how to give orders, … they kŶeǁ hoǁ to do thiŶgs aŶd theǇ didŶ͛t 
have to be told twice͟ (We Shall Remain, 2009).  
 
Their expertise would prove to be an essential asset to the occupiers, many of whom 
reported that conditions inside Wounded Knee felt very much like a warzone (DeCora, 
quoted in Anderson et al, 1974: 72-73; King, quoted in Silver, 1973: 2; We Shall Remain, 
2009; Zimmerman, 1976: 13 + 158 + 261-265). ͞I͛ŵ a VietŶaŵ ǀeteƌaŶ,͟ oŶe paƌtiĐipaŶt 
stated, ͞aŶd the thiŶgs I haǀe seeŶ heƌe … it͛s … like a flashďaĐk͟ ;KellǇ, Ƌuoted iŶ BaŶks & 
Erdoes, 2011: 177). Indeed, because of how exposed their position was at Wounded Knee, 
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and how disadvantaged they were in terms of manpower and firepower, the conditions 
endured by the security team were, in many ways, worse than those to which some of them 
had become accustomed while serving iŶ “outheast Asia. ͞We took ŵoƌe ďullets iŶ seǀeŶtǇ-
one days than I took iŶ tǁo Ǉeaƌs iŶ VietŶaŵ͟, Oglala ǀeteƌaŶ ‘ogeƌ IƌoŶ Cloud ;Ƌuoted iŶ 
Weyler, 1982: 83) stated. According to Russell Redner (quoted in Stern, 1994: 28), who had 
also seen a lot of action iŶ VietŶaŵ, ͞the fiƌefights at [WKII] ǁeƌe the ǁoƌst I eǀeƌ ǁent 
thƌough.͟ 
 
As one might expect, civilian occupiers found it more difficult to cope with the 
͞ĐhaotiĐ sĐeŶe͟ iŶside WouŶded KŶee, and thus were particularly reliant on their veteran 
peers ;Caŵp, ϮϬϬϵ; Kipp, ϭϵϵϳ: ϮϭϱͿ. ͞Aside fƌoŵ a feǁ dozeŶ … Đoŵďat ǀeteƌaŶs,͟ oŶe 
oďseƌǀeƌ ƌeŵiŶds us, ͞the people of WouŶded KŶee ǁeƌe as uŶfaŵiliaƌ ǁith this kiŶd of 
ǁaƌfaƌe as aŶǇ otheƌ toǁŶspeople iŶ AŵeƌiĐa͟ ;)iŵŵeƌŵaŶ, 1976: 197). Dwain Camp 
(2009), brother of AIM leader Carter Camp, arrived early in the occupation, and joined his 
brother in the security foƌĐe. ͞Not haǀiŶg ďeeŶ iŶ the … ŵilitaƌǇ͟, he ǁƌites, ͞I had Ŷot ďeeŶ 
uŶdeƌ eŶeŵǇ fiƌe … so I had soŵe tƌepidatioŶ͟ ;Caŵp, 2009). Only through seeking advice 
from veterans, including his brother Carter, was Camp (2009) able to learn how best to 
survive in this hostile environment.  
 
While military expertise may have afforded veterans certain practical advantages, as 
Russell Means (1995: 279-280) reminds us, in psychological terms, ͞[t]he ĐoŶstaŶt shootiŶg 
ǁas haƌd oŶ eǀeƌǇoŶe, iŶĐludiŶg the VietŶaŵ ǀeteƌaŶs.͟ IŶ faĐt, foƌ those ǁith Đoŵďat 
experience, many of whom would have been suffering from PTSD, it was especially difficult. 
Means (1995: 279) recalls one veteran who started to weep when the government forces 
began one of their nightly bombardments:  
He said, ͚Those fuĐkeƌs aƌe still fiƌiŶg at ŵe, aŶd look – this is what I gave to this 
fuĐkiŶg ĐouŶtƌǇ!͛ He ǁas iŶ a ǁheelĐhair, swaddled in a blanket. When he lifted it, I 
saw that both his legs were gone.  
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Generally, however, morale among the veterans inside Wounded Knee was high, 
mainly because, in contrast to their experiences of military service, they felt there was a real 
purpose to what they were having to endure at WKII. ͞Theƌe's a tƌeŵeŶdous aŵouŶt of 
ĐoolŶess, ĐoŶsideƌiŶg that ǁe'ƌe outguŶŶed … ĐoŶsideƌiŶg ouƌ odds,͟ oŶe Naǀajo ǀeteƌaŶ 
told reporters: 
[P]eople stay because they believe; they have a cause. That's why we lost in Viet 
Naŵ, … theƌe ǁas Ŷo Đause. We ǁeƌe fightiŶg a ƌiĐh ŵaŶ's ǁaƌ, foƌ the ƌiĐh ŵaŶ, 
being used as cannon fodder, with no regard for what happened to us at all. In 
Wounded Knee, we're doing pretty damn good, morale-wise (Anderson et al, 1974: 
79-80). 
 
Moreover, although, in a practical sense, they applied their US military training to 
constructing and manning the defences at WKII, in more abstract terms, Holdeƌ͛s seĐuƌitǇ 
force did not approach their role as the defenders of Wounded Knee from a conventional US 
military perspective. Some of the veterans inside Wounded Knee, as we have seen, had 
come to see the US armed forces as an immoral entity, an arbiter of imperialism, and at 
WKII they reacted against its conventions, preferring to take their cues from older, more 
traditional Native iŶflueŶĐes. ͞We kŶeǁ ǁe had to fight͟, Caƌteƌ Caŵp ;Ƌuoted iŶ Doǁell, 
ϮϬϭϭͿ lateƌ stated, ͞ďut ǁe Đould Ŷot fight oŶ WasiĐu [i.e. the ǁhite ŵaŶ͛s] teƌŵs.͟  
 
Traditional Native ideas about warriorhood were foremost in the minds of the 
occupiers, who generally referred to themselves, and, indeed, all other militant advocates of 
Red Power, with pride as warriors – even a baby that was born to one of the occupiers was 
duďďed ͞ouƌ little WouŶded KŶee ǁaƌƌioƌ͟ ;BaŶks & Erdoes, 2011: 194). As mentioned 
above, for many of its members, AIM itself was basically a large-scale, pan-tribal warrior 
society, and, by mid-March, the WKII security force had formed their own sub-warrior 
society, one which stood in opposition to the conventions of the US military (Banks & 
Erdoes, 2011: 182; Beaver County Times, 1973: A3).  
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The philosophy behind this so-Đalled ͞Neǁ Waƌƌioƌ “oĐietǇ͟, as explained to the 
press by Stan Holder (quoted in Anderson et al, 1974: 76-77), was a synthesis of traditional 
Native ways of thinking about warfare and warriorhood with modern military technology 
and tactics (Means, quoted in Beaver County Times, 1973: A3). Holder (quoted in Anderson 
et al, 1974: 76-77)– ǁho, the ƌeadeƌ ŵaǇ ƌeĐall, felt he had ďeeŶ ͞ďƌaiŶǁashed͟ to hate the 
Vietnamese while in service – expressed his disdain for the way in which the US military 
͞dehuŵaŶized͟ ďoth its oǁŶ GIs aŶd the people it was fighting – both in Vietnam and at 
WKII (Hearts and Minds, 1974). ͞That͛s ǁhǇ theǇ ƌake the eŶtiƌe toǁŶ ǁith fiƌe ǁheŶ theǇ 
opeŶ up oŶ us,͟ he stated, ͞TheǇ just haǀe Ŷo peƌsoŶal feeliŶg at all͟ (Holder, quoted in 
Anderson et al, 1974: 76-77).  
 
Holder (quoted in Anderson et al, 1974: 76-77), on the other hand, appears to have 
envisioned his own role as that of the war chiefs of old – he treated the members of his 
security team as equals, and encouraged them to adhere to traditional Native conceptions 
of warriorhood, aŶd to aĐkŶoǁledge the ͞spiƌitual aspeĐt͟ of ǁhat theǇ ǁeƌe doiŶg. To this 
end, fellow veteran-occupiers Carter Camp and Sid Mills arranged a routine so that those 
statioŶed iŶ the ďuŶkeƌs aŶd eǆposed to the ǀioleŶĐe of ͞the fiƌiŶg liŶe͟ Đould spiƌituallǇ 
purify themselves with nightly sweat baths – ceremonies similar to those some of them had 
undergone after returning from service (Banks & Erdoes, 2011: 185).  
 
Moreover, having made a conscious decision to join this fight, Holdeƌ͛s foƌĐe did not 
need to be subjected to the sort of strict discipline to which military personnel were 
accustomed (Holder, quoted in Anderson et al, 1974: 76-77). ͞It͛s a ϭϴϬ-degree change from 
the U.“. ŵilitaƌǇ͟, Holder (quoted in Anderson et al, 1974: 76-77) declared: 
The men here – theǇ doŶ't gƌipe, theǇ doŶ't saǇ, ͚it's Đold out,͛ oƌ aŶǇthiŶg like that. 
TheǇ ƌealize … theƌe's a Ŷeed to defeŶd theiƌ ǁoŵeŶ aŶd ĐhildƌeŶ …, … a need to 
defend the saĐƌed laŶd … we're living on, and they do it. They keep their respect for 
nature. They don't go around wanting to defoliate, as the [US] did in Viet Nam. They 
don't go around wanting to indiscriminately kill people, because they realize that the 
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loss of a life, whether a white, black, red, or yellow, is still the loss of a life and it's a 
loss to nature, it's upsetting the balance. 
 
͞Ouƌs ǁas a ǁoŶdeƌfullǇ stƌaŶge aƌŵǇ͟, Dennis Banks (& Erdoes, 2011: 182-184) 
tells us, ͞as uŶlike the U.“. aƌŵǇ as possiďle … aŶ aƌŵǇ of eƋuals … of ŵeŶ aŶd ǁoŵeŶ ǁho 
respected life and hated killiŶg͟. To the veterans inside Wounded Knee, these ideas about 
the responsibilities of Native warriorhood – as opposed to the alleged irresponsibility and 
moral bankruptcy of the US armed forces – were particularly prescient. Russell Redner 
(quoted in Stern, 1994: 29), for instance, came to feel that, despite his time in service, he 
had not really been deserving of the title warrior until he took part in WKII. ͞This is a ǁaƌ … 
just like ͚Naŵ ǁas͟, ‘edŶeƌ ;Ƌuoted iŶ “teƌŶ, ϭϵϵϰ: ϮϵͿ stated, ͞But I͛ŵ a ǁaƌƌioƌ Ŷoǁ … 
pƌoteĐtiŶg ŵǇ people. At least Ŷoǁ I kŶoǁ ǁhat I͛ŵ fightiŶg foƌ. The tƌaiŶiŶg theǇ gaǀe ŵe 
I͛ll put to good use.͟ 
 
As a former specialist in counter-insurgency, Holder͛s oǁŶ military training meant 
that he understood not only how to fight insurgents, but also how to be an insurgent 
(Dewing, 1995: 69). Much like the Vietnamese Communists, the security team at WKII were 
wholly outmatched by the government forces, and limited to a strictly defensive position, 
with their sole objective being to hold out for as long as possible, and hope that popular 
opinion would turn in their favour (Kipp, 1997: 221). In doing so, they consciously employed 
similar strategies of resistance – ͞gueƌƌilla ǁaƌfaƌe taĐtiĐs͟, as some veteran-occupiers put it 
– to those used by the insurgents in Vietnam (Anderson et al, 1974: 197-198).  
 
Like their Vietnamese counterparts, they relied on stealth and an understanding of 
the local landscape to remain highly mobile and to avoid being pinned down in lengthy and 
expensive – in terms of ammunition – firefights, exercising what they would refer to as 
͞patieŶĐe͟ aŶd ͞ƌestƌaiŶt͟ in the face of government aggression in hopes of outlasting their 
enemy (Anderson et al, 1974: 145 + 197-198). They exaggerated their numbers and 
capabilities, even displaying fake weaponry in order to convince the authorities and the 
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media that they had access to much more than a small supply of hunting rifles and shotguns 
(Carroll, 2008: 169-170; Means, 1995: 280-281; The Sunday Times, 1973: 5).  
 
Likewise, when government negotiators came into Wounded Knee, Dennis Banks 
made a show of force by running the security squads through military drills (Means, 1995: 
280). Although they mostly remained on the defensive, members of the security team 
sometimes ventured out to harass the government forces, sneaking up on their armoured 
personnel carriers (APCs) and ricocheting bullets off of them in order to unnerve those 
holed up inside (Means, 1995: 280).  
 
The oĐĐupieƌs͛ only military-grade firearm, an AK-47, was of little practical use to the 
security force – inside sources claim there was no ammunition for the weapon, while others 
say it had less than 50 rounds (Banks & Erdoes, 2011: 163; Silver, quoted in Harrington, 
2014). Instead, it was used as a showpiece to attract government and media attention, and 
it worked, garnering considerable controversy – some conservative media outlets even used 
photos of the Soviet-made weapon to claim that the WKII occupiers were being supplied by 
foreign Communists (Banks & Erdoes, 2011: 163; Dewing, 1995: 69; Holm, 1996: 177; Kipp, 
1997: 220; Zimmerman, 1976: 165-166). Such claims were patently false, and the AK-47 had 
most likely been captured in Vietnam and brought back either by its owner, Kiowa veteran 
Robert Onco – whose service record has since been disputed, and may or may not have 
served in Vietnam – or another of his veteran peers (Kipp, 1997: 220-221; Urbom, 2012: 
161-162).  
 
However, the conservative press was right on one front – the influence of the 
Vietnamese Communists on the veteran-insurgents inside Wounded Knee was more than 
just practical. Some felt a real sense of solidarity with their former enemies, coming to 
believe that they, as non-white insurgents facing off against an invading, technologically 
superior white-run military force, were, in many ways, fighting for the same cause, and that 
the tactics being used against them by government forces – i.e. propaganda, excessive 
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firepower, destruction of the natural environment, and the use of fellow Natives against one 
another – were also the same as those used in Vietnam (Anderson et al, 1974: 113 + 123 + 
128 + 194-201).  
 
One occupier told reporters how the veterans inside Wounded Knee often compared 
their own cause to that of the Vietnamese Communists (Battle Acts, 1973: 26-ϮϳͿ. ͞MaŶǇ … 
thiŶgs ǁeƌe diffeƌeŶt͟, theǇ adŵitted, ͞aŶd ĐeƌtaiŶlǇ Ŷot oŶ the [same] scale …, but we 
were [both] fightiŶg the iŵpeƌialist U.“. goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͟ ;Battle Acts, 1973: 26-27). Indeed, a 
number of scholars have gone so far as to suggest that, in both material and abstract terms, 
the occupation was effectively a ͞ƌe-ĐƌeatioŶ͟, or miniaturisation, of the conflict in 
Southeast Asia (Marez, 2004: 265-268; Rosier, 2009: 262-269; Tóth, 2016: 36-37). As 
historian Heike Paul (2014: 347) puts it, duƌiŶg WKII, ͚͞IŶdiaŶ CouŶtƌǇ͛ ŵigƌated ďaĐk fƌoŵ 
VietŶaŵ to the AŵeƌiĐaŶ heaƌtlaŶd͟. 
 
Many within the contemporary radical community shared this interpretation. The 
underground press likened the foreign colonialism of the war in Vietnam to the domestic 
colonialism they felt was in evidence at WKII – ͞“aŵe Fight – “aŵe Foe͟, as oŶe ǀeteƌaŶs͛ 
publication put it (e.g. Column Left, 1973: 1 + 7; Lewis-McChord Free Press, 1973: 4; 
Liberated Barracks: Service News for Occupied Hawaii, 1973: 6). Non-Native veterans, 
mostly advocates of the peace movement who had developed similar ideas about the 
connections between Native America and Vietnam, were important supporters (Anderson 
et al, 1974: 72-73 + 80-81 + 194-195). VVAW, in particular, contributed money and supplies 
to the occupiers, spread word of the occupation, and smuggled a number of its members 
into the hamlet, most notably a seven-man counter-sniper team who joined the security 
force (Berkeley Barb, 1973: 2; Churchill, 2015: 712; Moser, 1996: 118).  
 
On March 7, and again on April 17, supplies were flown into Wounded Knee by 
plane, and on both occasions the supply-drops were organised primarily by non-Native 
veterans. The first drop was made by Rocky Madrid and Owen Luck (2006), both of whom 
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had served as medics in Vietnam and, at WKII, put their medical training to use in helping 
Đaƌe foƌ iŶjuƌed seĐuƌitǇ teaŵ ŵeŵďeƌs ;BaŶks & Eƌdoes, ϮϬϭϭ; ϭϳϲ + ϭϴϴ; O͛Neill, ϮϬϭϯͿ. 
The April 17 drop was a more ambitious affair, made by a larger group of non-Native anti-
ǁaƌ aĐtiǀists, soŵe of ǁhoŵ had seƌǀed iŶ VietŶaŵ, aŶd had Đoŵe to ƌeĐogŶise ͞stƌikiŶg 
paƌallels͟ ďetǁeeŶ the eǆĐessiǀe aŶd ƌaĐist ǀioleŶĐe of the oŶgoiŶg ĐoŶfliĐt iŶ “outheast 
Asia, the historic Indian Wars, and the current standoff at WKII (Zimmerman, 1976: 10-11 + 
67-71 + 106-108 + 158-159 + 178-181 + 201 + 276 + 310 + 346).  
 
With such ideas foremost in the minds of those defending Wounded Knee, the fact 
that their Vietnamese counterparts had by this time effectively prevailed over the US 
military, in the face of overwhelming odds, was an important motivational factor. A number 
of the Native veteran-occupiers who had formed structures of recognition while in service 
told the press that they felt they held the same deeply spiritual connection to their ancestral 
lands as those held by the Vietnamese, and that without such a connection, without such 
deep ŵotiǀatioŶs, the U“ aƌŵed foƌĐes ǁeƌe ͞gettiŶg theiƌ ass kiĐked͟ iŶ VietŶaŵ, and 
would never truly prevail at WKII either (Anderson et al, 1974: 194-197). ͞“oŵethiŶg else 
ǁe leaƌŶed fƌoŵ … Viet Naŵ͟, oŶe ǀeteƌaŶ-oĐĐupieƌ added, ͞is about technology and 
machinery͟:  
A ŵaŶ ĐaŶ sit iŶ a ŵaĐhiŶe aŶd thiŶk he is supeƌioƌ ǁheŶ he's aĐtuallǇ Ŷot …  We 
have this tendency to … under-estimate ourselves and what we can do. But with a 
little courage and strength on our part and a little knowledge of what we are up 
against, [the US] can be defeated. There's nothing but people sitting in those 
machines and behind those guns (Anderson et al, 1974: 197-198). 
 
When the government sent Phantom jets over Wounded Knee, Woody Kipp (1997: 
210), who had arrived early on in the occupation alongside another Blackfoot Vietnam 
veteran by the name of Bradley LaPlant, began to understand how the technologically 
undeveloped Vietnamese peasantry must have felt when the US sent its most sophisticated 
war machines against them. He also recognised the irony inherent in the fact that he had 
once been responsiďle foƌ the ŵaiŶteŶaŶĐe of these jets ďaĐk iŶ VietŶaŵ. ͞[H]eƌe, oŶ the 
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PlaiŶs of … “outh Dakota, the fighteƌ ďoŵďeƌs … that I, foƌ tǁeŶtǇ loŶg ŵoŶths, had 
ideŶtified ǁith, ǁeƌe lookiŶg foƌ ŵe͟, Kipp ;ϭϵϵϳ: ϮϭϰͿ ǁƌites: 
I knew these birds of pƌeǇ … TheǇ ďelong to my uncle, Sam. Hey, Uncle! Uncle Sam, 
look it͛s ŵe, Ǉouƌ Ŷepheǁ WoodǇ; it͛s ŵe ǁho fed Ǉouƌ ďiƌds ǁhile Ǉou ǁeƌe 
ŶegotiatiŶg oƌ doiŶg ǁhateǀeƌ it is Ǉou ďig shots do duƌiŶg a ǁaƌ … I thought ǁe 
were fighting for all those good things I learned about iŶ high sĐhool … fƌeedoŵ, 
deŵoĐƌaĐǇ, justiĐe … AĐtuallǇ, UŶĐle, I feel ŵuĐh Đloseƌ to those ideals ǁheŶ I aŵ 
fightiŶg foƌ ŵǇ oǁŶ people heƌe iŶ ŵǇ hoŵe ĐouŶtƌǇ, ǁheƌe I͛ŵ ŵoƌe suƌe aďout 
what [we are] trying to accomplish. 
 
It was during such instances that Kipp (2004: 126) experienced what he calls an 
͞epiphaŶǇ͟. During a firefight one evening, Kipp (2004: 130-131) and LaPlant rushed to the 
cover of their ďuŶkeƌ. ͞We laǇ oŶ the flat gƌouŶd,͟ he ƌeĐalls, ͞ďullets stƌeakiŶg oǀeƌ us … 
[from] the same machiŶe guŶs I had ďeeŶ tƌaiŶed to use to kill Viet CoŶg͟ ;Kipp, ϮϬϬϰ: ϭϯϬ-
131). While under fire, the faŵiliaƌ phƌase, ͞You same same Viet Cong͟, Đaŵe ďaĐk to Kipp 
(2004: 126 + 130-ϭϯϭͿ, this tiŵe takiŶg oŶ a ŵuĐh ŵoƌe liteƌal ŵeaŶiŶg. ͞I was the gook 
now͟, he ƌealised, ͞No ǁoŶdeƌ the VietŶaŵese … had presciently told me, You same same 
Viet Cong. I daŵŶ suƌe ǁas͟ ;Kipp, ϮϬϬϰ: ϭϮϲͿ.  
 
Other members of the security force came to much the same conclusion. Guy Dull 
Knife, Jr. (quoted in Rosier, 2009: 265), for instance, felt that ͞[we] had become the Viet 
CoŶg iŶ ouƌ oǁŶ hoŵelaŶd͟, and Bill Means (quoted in Rosier, 2009: 265) would later state 
that he and his fellow veteran-insurgents ͞ǁeŶt fƌoŵ ďeiŶg the huŶteƌ … to ďeiŶg the 
huŶted͟. The structures of recognition that these veterans had formed in Vietnam had now 
come full circle – the termite killers had become the termites once more.  
 
Like Sid Mills before him, Kipp (2004: 48) came to the ĐoŶĐlusioŶ that ͞I ǁas liǀiŶg iŶ 
a ĐouŶtƌǇ ǁhose people ǁould use ŵe foƌ theiƌ oǁŶ ƌeasoŶs … theŶ tuƌŶ theiƌ guŶs oŶ ŵe 
ǁheŶ I Ŷo loŶgeƌ suited theiƌ puƌpose.͟ When Oglala veteran Webster Poor Bear was 
injured during a firefight on March 8, his father, former tribal chairman Enos Poor Bear 
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(quoted in Riseman, 2015: 215), came to a similar realisation, and expressed his outrage to 
the press in strong teƌŵs. ͞It aiŶ͛t ƌight͟, he laŵeŶted, ͞MǇ ďoǇ ǁas a paƌatƌoopeƌ iŶ 
Vietnam and he got a Purple Heart fighting for his country. Now federal marshals have shot 
hiŵ. I tell Ǉou, it aiŶ͛t ƌight͟ (Poor Bear, quoted in Riseman, 2015: 215). ͞MǇ soŶ ǁeŶt 
thƌough VietŶaŵ ǁithout gettiŶg a sĐƌatĐh,͟ he ĐoŶtiŶued, ͞aŶd Ŷoǁ he gets shot ďǇ the 
same government that sent him there͟ ;Pooƌ Beaƌ, Ƌuoted iŶ BuƌŶette & Kosteƌ, ϭϵϳϰ: Ϯϯϰ-
235).  
 
Likewise, when Oglala ex-Marine Buddy Lamont was shot and killed during a firefight 
on April 27, those closest to him expressed similar sentiments. IŶ the ǁake of LaŵoŶt͛s 
passing, Oglala medicine man and fellow occupier Wallace Black Elk (quoted in Anderson et 
al, 1974: 233) issued an assertive statement to the press: 
This boy was murdered by the United States Government. He served in Viet Nam, he 
fought for them. Then wheŶ he Đaŵe hoŵe to ask foƌ his ƌights, [theǇ said] ͚You shut 
up — oƌ else!͛ AŶd theŶ theǇ shot hiŵ, ƌight thƌough his heaƌt. 
 
Agnes Lamont (quoted in Stern, 1994: 156-157), mother of Buddy and herself an 
important movement advocate, spoke in similar terms of heƌ soŶ͛s deŵise at the haŶds of 
the authorities:  
He ǀoluŶteeƌed, ǁeŶt iŶ the seƌǀiĐe … to go aĐƌoss, [to] fight foƌ his ĐouŶtƌǇ … AŶd … 
iŶ the eŶd the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt killed ŵǇ soŶ. He should haǀe got killed oǀeƌseas … I͛d 
feel ŵuĐh ďetteƌ if he͛s killed iŶ ǁaƌ … ďut he Đaŵe ďaĐk aliǀe … TheŶ he ǁeŶt iŶto 
… WouŶded KŶee. That ǁas his ďelief. AŶd heƌe Đoŵes UŶĐle “aŵ aŶd killed hiŵ … 
ƌight theƌe oŶ his oǁŶ laŶd …  
 
LaŵoŶt͛s seŶd-off was that of both a US soldier and a Native warrior – emblematic 
of the dual, hybridised identity assumed by many of the veterans inside Wounded Knee. 
During the funeral, he was accorded military honours. UŶdeƌ DeŶŶis BaŶks͛ ;& Eƌdoes, ϮϬϭϭ: 
207-208) orders, ten security force members stood at attention and gave their former 
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cohort a 100-gun salute, and his grave bore his Army serial number and the name of the unit 
he had served with back in Vietnam (McKiernan, 2014). Banks, ǁe aƌe told, ͞spoke of hiŵ as 
a ǁaƌƌioƌ ǁho died a ǁaƌƌioƌ͛s death͟ ;AŶdeƌsoŶ et al, ϭϵϳϰ: 232). The loss of Lamont was a 
major blow to the occupiers, and was a significant factor in their decision to finally agree to 
a permanent truce, and to bring the occupation to an end (Banks & Erdoes, 2011: 4 + 208).  
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Conclusion 
 
Not all of the radical Native veterans involved in WKII joined the security force. 
Desperate to avoid bloodshed, Hank Adams was, again, a key mediator between the 
occupiers and the authorities, and was instrumental in organising the final ceasefire (Adams, 
2006). Though sympathetic to AIM, Ed McGaa (2014: 242-245), who was from Pine Ridge, 
served as a government-paid negotiator. Pine Ridge resident Darrell New Plenty Stars (& 
Evans, 2008: 29-55 + 58-62 + 70-71 + 88) had by this time become a Christian and turned 
away from the use of violence, but he supported the occupiers in other ways, smuggling 
supplies and people into the hamlet, spreading word of the occupation, which he felt was 
not being reported truthfully in the press, and even allowing the militants to use his home 
as a safe house.  
 
Overall, however, Native American Vietnam-era veterans assumed a starring role as 
the defenders of WKII, and were it not for their expertise and unique ideas about the 
connections between themselves and their former enemies, the occupiers would most likely 
have been unable to hold out against the government in the way that they did. Without 
these veterans, the occupation, which had a profound influence on the development of the 
movement thereafter, and has since become an iconic symbol of Red Power, would likely 
either have ended quickly and faded into obscurity, or have ended in a bloodbath. Indeed, 
the fact that Buddy Lamont was one of only two fatalities suffered by the occupiers inside 
Wounded Knee – despite being trapped in an exposed, virtually undefendable, position, and 
under constant fire – is almost certainly a testament to the expertise and staying power of 
the veterans involved.  
 
Although the roles assumed by Native veterans in most other spheres of the wider 
Red Power movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s were not as high-profile, or as 
characteristic in terms of the practical expertise they were called upon to employ, they 
appear to have been well represented among the membership and leadership of the major 
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Red Power organisations of the era, and the influence of their ideas about the war and the 
military was made apparent during such key events as the UO symposium and the TBT. 
However, as the reader may have noticed, our knowledge base concerning the contributions 
made by Native veterans to the Red Power movement, outside of WKII, is sorely lacking, and 
full of gaps which can only be filled by more research.  
 
Through their application of Red Power ideology to their work with the GI resistance 
movement, Native advocates of GI resistance in the Pacific Northwest were at the forefront 
– if only for a brief time – of what might reasonably be described as a seƌǀiĐeŵeŶ͛s wing of 
Red Power. While the same cannot be said of Natiǀe ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶs to the ǀeteƌaŶs͛ wing of 
the anti-war movement, which were not coordinated, and appear to have been modest by 
comparison, what they lacked in numbers was more than made up for by the power of their 
ideas, which reached the highest levels of that movement at a critical moment, when both 
official and popular attention was focused on the war and those who were making a stand 
against it. As previously unexplored areas of study, the scale and significance of Native 
contributions to the GI ƌesistaŶĐe aŶd ǀeteƌaŶs͛ aŶti-war movements remains to be seen, 
and, again, much more research into all aspects of this little known topic is needed if we are 
to be able to write in less speculative terms.  
 
In the aftermath of WKII, the authorities came down hard on the movement, and the 
heyday of Red Power came to an end, but some radical Native veterans continued to make 
characteristic contributions, and to apply their military expertise to armed activism, 
especially among the Algonquian and Iroquoian warrior societies of southern Canada and 
the northern US (Carroll, 2008: 151-154). In mid-1973, for instance, when a newly-formed 
Mohawk warrior society in Kahnawake, Quebec made efforts to evict non-Native people 
from their land, the Vietnam veterans among them gave their civilian peers military-style 
training, and were thereby able to successfully repulse Quebec authorities when they 
attempted to intervene (George-Kanentiio, 2006: 34-35; York & Pindera, 1991: 178).  
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The following spring, when warriors from Kahnawake and Akwesasne, NY occupied 
an area of Moss Lake, NY and established a settlement called Ganienkeh, the occupiers 
iŶǀited AIM to Đoŵe aŶd set up ͞a laŶd ďase … ǁheƌe theiƌ VietŶaŵ ǀeteƌaŶs ŵaǇ tƌaiŶ 
ǇouŶg ǁaƌƌioƌs iŶ the aƌt of defeŶdiŶg theiƌ hoŵelaŶd͟ ;Hall, Ƌuoted iŶ Baƌloǁ, ϮϬϬϰ: ϮϬϲ; 
George-Kanentiio, 2006: 34-35). Although the promised land base was never established, 
“haǁŶee Đoŵďat ǀeteƌaŶ aŶd foƌŵeƌ WKII oĐĐupieƌ ‘iĐhaƌd ͚CaƌtooŶ͛ Alfoƌd Đaŵe to help 
the Ganienkeh militants construct their defences, and organised and trained an effective 
security force that would ultimately hold the site for more than three years (Landsman, 
1988: 185-186; York & Pindera, 1991: 178-179).  
 
Russell Redner (quoted in Stern, 1994: 278-279) continued to view his work with AIM 
as a war – a cause for which he was more than willing to take up arms. In late 1975, he was 
among a group of fugitive Red Power activists apprehended after a shootout with the FBI. 
During the subsequent legal proceedings, Redner (quoted in Stern, 1994: 29 + 235-238) 
refused to talk or to make deals with the authorities, instead reaffirming his identity as a 
warrior, and referencing his veterancy in such a way as to further imply that he considered 
his ĐuƌƌeŶt aĐtiǀities ŵuĐh ŵoƌe ǁoƌthǁhile thaŶ ǁhat he had doŶe iŶ VietŶaŵ. ͞MǇ Ŷaŵe 
is ‘uss ‘edŶeƌ͟, he asseƌted, ͞I doŶ͛t haǀe a ƌaŶk oƌ seƌial Ŷuŵďeƌ aŶǇŵoƌe. I͛ŵ a ǁarrior 
foƌ ŵǇ IŶdiaŶ people … ǁaƌƌioƌs doŶ͛t suƌƌeŶdeƌ, aŶd that͛s all theƌe is to it͟ ;‘edŶeƌ, 
quoted in Stern, 1994: 29 + 235-238).  
 
Moreover, the influence of Native Vietnam-era veterans in this respect continued 
long after the war in Vietnam came to an end, most notably during a spate of armed 
confrontations between Mohawk militants and Canadian and US authorities in the 1980s 
and 90s, such as those at Akwesasne, NY, and Oka and Ipperwash in Canada, where, once 
again, they applied the skills they had learned during service, taking an even more 
militaristic approach than they had at WKII (Busatta, 2005: 4; Lackenbauer, 2014: 184-185; 
Swain, 2010: 60-61 + 86 + 217; York & Pindera, 1991: 135-136 + 139-140 + 240-241 + 244-
247 + 305 + 357 + 360-361). Thus, nearly twenty years after the last US servicemen had 
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returned from Vietnam, Native Vietnam-era veterans continued to play a characteristic role 
in Red Power activism that was directly inspired by their experiences of military service.  
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